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Abstract:  We estimate the “place premium”—the wage gain that accrues to foreign 
workers who arrive to work in the United States. First, we estimate the predicted, 
purchasing-power adjusted wages of people inside and outside the United States who are 
otherwise observably identical—with the same country of birth, country of education, 
years of education, work experience, sex, and rural or urban residence. We use new and 
uniquely rich micro-data on the wages and characteristics of over two million individual 
formal-sector wage-earners in 43 countries (including the US). Second, we examine the 
extent to which these wage ratios for observably equivalent workers may overstate the 
gains to a marginal mover because movers may be positively selected on unobservable 
productivity in their home country. New evidence for nine of the countries, combined 
with a range of existing evidence, suggests that this overstatement can be significant, but 
is typically modest in magnitude. Third, we estimate the degree to which policy barriers 
to labor movement in and of themselves sustain the place premium, by bounding the 
premia observed under self-selected migration alone. Finally, we show that the policy-
induced portion of the place premium in wages represents one of the largest remaining 
price distortions in any global market; is much larger than wage discrimination in 
spatially integrated markets; and makes labor mobility capable of reducing households’ 
poverty at the margin by much more than any known in situ intervention. 1 Introduction 
 
Two facts are obvious to even the most casual traveler in the contemporary, supposedly 
globalized, world. Every (legal) traveler’s very first experience in every country is an 
encounter with the agent of the state responsible for enforcing that country’s restrictions 
on the international movement of people—especially workers. Thus the single most 
obvious fact to a global traveler is the enforcement by every country of a complex, 
quantity-based set of impediments to the movement of labor. The second most obvious 
fact, at least to any traveler outside the rich world, is the enormous differences across 
countries in wages and standards of living. 
 
We examine the connection between those two facts: barriers to labor mobility, and 
international wage gaps. Our goal is an estimate of magnitude of the “place premium” to 
working the US—the difference in the real (consumption deflated) wages of workers of 
equal intrinsic productivity on opposite sides of the US border—that is sustained by 
restrictions on labor mobility. This ambitious goal requires three steps. 
 
First, we use a unique harmonized database on the purchasing power-adjusted wages and 
other traits of over two million workers in 42 countries plus the United States. This 
allows us to predict the wages of observably identical workers on either side of the US 
border for people from each of those countries. Crucially, the US census data identify 
each individual’s country of birth and, for the foreign-born, their year of arrival in the 
US. Hence our definition of “observably identical” allows us to compare not only people 
with the same standard traits (years of schooling, age, sex, rural/urban residence) but 
different nationality, but to directly compare workers born and educated in the same 
country. This implicitly controls for nationality-specific characteristics that affect 
productivity in the US (e.g. culture, language) and the quality and relevance of a 
country’s schooling to US labor market outcomes. For instance, in our preferred 
econometric specification, a Peruvian-born, Peruvian-educated, 35 year-old urban male 
formal sector wage-worker with 9 years of schooling earns an average of $1,714 per 
month working in the United States but the average person with these observable traits 
    
 
earns P$452 (P$ are purchasing power parity adjusted US dollars) working in Peru. The 
wage ratio, Ro (where the subscript signifies “observably identical”), is 3.8. 
 
For each of the 42 countries, we estimate Ro: the ratio of wages earned by workers in the 
United States to wages earned by observably identical workers abroad.
1 The typical wage 
ratio is very large: Peru’s ratio Ro of 3.8 is near the median of 4.11. And this ratio varies 
greatly across countries: Estimates of Ro range from 2.0 for the Dominican Republic to 
15.5 for Yemen. The 75
th percentile of Ro is 6.5, while the 25
th percentile is 2.8.  
 
The second part of the paper grapples with the issue, common to all attempts to measure 
wage discrimination, of selectivity. What we need is an estimate of the counter-factual: 
the wages of the workers in the US had they remained in their home country. No matter 
how many individual traits are controlled for, wage differentials for observably 
equivalent workers are not exact estimates of wage differentials between workers of 
equal intrinsic productivity. While our estimates of Ro account for cross-national wage 
differentials due to selection on observables, some part of the wage gap between foreign-
born workers in the US and observably identical workers abroad may be due to selection 
on unobservable determinants of productivity. This could be due to self-selection (e.g. 
those with more unobservable “pluck” move) and selection by migration policy or US 
employers (which might select those among a group of observably identical workers with 
the highest productivity). We need a method to estimate Re (where the subscript denotes 
“equivalent”), the cross-border wage ratio for an observably and unobservably identical 
worker—the same person. Re, not Ro, is the place premium. 
 
We therefore present new evidence about the degree of migrant selection on 
unobservable determinants of wages, for nine of the 42 countries where existing data 
allow the calculation. This permits us to roughly estimate Re for nine countries. For 
example, the evidence suggests that emigrants from Peru come from somewhere around 
                                                 
1 Rosenzweig (2006) also estimates gains to movement from differences in the “skill price”—the price of equivalently 
skilled labor in different labor markets--using observed wage changes of the same individuals from the US New 
Immigrant Survey. His analysis focuses more on higher-skill workers within a joint model of mobility decisions and 
skill acquisition (e.g. the decision to seek higher education in the US) whereas in this paper we focus on lower-skill 
workers using individual-level survey data across countries.  
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the 69
th percentile of the distribution of unobserved wage determinants. This implies that 
an observably and unobservably identical prime-age urban formal-sector male Peruvian 
with nine years of Peruvian schooling earns about 2.6 times as much in the US as in Peru. 
This is one of several cases where our estimates of Ro for moderately skilled workers 
exceed the place premium Re. Even after this correction, however, the estimates of Re are 
very large—including 3.5 for the Philippines and 7.8 for Haiti. These estimates of Re are 
“marginal” in two distinct senses: (i) it is the effect on the wage of the next person who 
would arrive after a small relaxation of the migration barrier—not the effect of moving 
the average person chosen at random from the sending country; and (ii) it is the marginal 
effect given a small relaxation of current restrictions—not the general equilibrium wages 
under fully open borders which involves considerations of how mobile labor would affect 
capital accumulation and Total Factor Productivity (Klein and Ventura 2004).  
 
We corroborate these findings with a range of other evidence, both microeconomic and 
macroeconomic, that bears on the degree of migrant selection. These calculations yield 
the remarkably consistent result that selection of moderate skill movers on unobservable 
home-country wage determinants results in a ratio of Ro/Re (the ratio of the observably 
identical to “equal productivity” wage ratios) of around 1.2, varying from 1.0 (no bias at 
all) to about 1.5 (substantial positive selection) for different countries. Even adjusting our 
estimates of Ro for the 42 countries for reasonable estimates of the degree of selection, 
the resulting estimates of Re remain very large for most countries. For instance, even if 
one assumed that the highest degree of positive selection on unobservable wage 
determinants seen for any country applies to all 42 countries,
2 Re would still exceed 3 in 
20 out of 42 countries and would still exceed 2 (a doubling of wages from crossing the 
border) in all but four. 
 
Once we have estimates, direct or indirect, of Re, the third step is to ask how much of the 
observed differences in wages of equal intrinsic productivity workers across the border is 
due to policy barriers to labor mobility and how much could be attributed to “natural” 
                                                 
2 That is, assuming that the mean migrant’s counterfactual home-country wage would equal the 70
th 
percentile of wages for an observably identical worker (35 year-old urban male with 9 years of education). 
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barriers that would cause equilibrium Re > 1 even in “borderless” labor markets. Workers 
might require a compensating differential to bear the costs—broadly considered—of 
moving to a new land. These include the difficulty of learning a new language, being 
away from one’s family, and entering new social networks, as well as the direct cost of 
travel. Workers might also be credit-constrained and have difficulty financing the move. 
We estimate the wage differentials consistent with free mobility using data from a variety 
of contemporary and historical situations with legally integrated, but spatially separated 
and cultural distinct labor markets. These data suggest that real wage ratios higher than 
1.5 to 1.8 are unlikely to be sustained by natural barriers alone. Wage ratios higher than 
this are consistent with either substantial labor mobility or policy induced barriers. 
 
The paper concludes by relating our results to three separate literatures on border-induced 
price wedges, wage discrimination, and the marginal impacts of antipoverty policies. To 
make a crude and conservative estimate, suppose we begin with the median estimated 
wage gap for an observably identical worker of about P$15,000 per year. Adjusting this 
figure both for reasonable estimates of migrant selection on unobservables and for 
compensating differentials, this suggests that existing border distortions produce an 
available welfare gain to a marginal moderate-skill mover from a typical developing 
country of around P$10,000 year. This is a massive cross-border price wedge and dwarfs 
the welfare gains from liberalizations in other markets. Legally-enforced, nationality-
based wage discrimination is massive compared to wage discrimination based on other 
socially constructed categories irrelevant to intrinsic productivity, such as race or 
sex/gender. This gain to a mover is roughly double the average GDP per capita of all 
developing economies in aggregate (P$4,911 in 2007). Thus it is not surprising that the 
per-person gains in income or poverty reduction from available public policies or 
programmatic interventions are tiny fractions of the gains from relaxing the obstacles to 
the movement of poor people.  
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2  Wage ratios for observably identical workers across the border 
 
We begin by estimating Ro, the ratio between what a typical worker earns in the United 
States and what an observably identical worker earns in each of 42 developing countries. 
In the following section we will turn to Re, the ratio between US and foreign earnings for 
an equivalent (observably and unobservably identical) worker. Only Re is the “place 
premium”. 
 
2.1 Data 
 
As used here, “observably identical” means a person of the same country of birth, same 
country of education, same level of education, same age, same gender, and same 
classification of dwelling as “rural” or “urban”. Controlling for these observable traits is 
made possible by a new, standardized collection of individual level data sets on wage-
earners compiled by the World Bank,
3 combined with the US Census Public Use 
Microdata Sample (PUMS) five percent file. 
 
The unified database describes 2,015,411 individual wage-earners residing in 43 
countries close to the year 2000. This comprises 891,158 individuals residing in 42 
developing countries, 623,934 individuals born in those same 42 developing countries but 
residing in the US, and 500,319 individuals born in the US and residing in the US. Each 
individual record contains the person’s wage in 1999 US dollars at Purchasing Power 
Parity, country of residence, years of schooling, age, sex, an indicator of urban or rural 
residence, and indicator variables for the periodicity of the reported wage (weekly, 
monthly, etc., with monthly as the base group). For those residing in the US, there is 
additional information on country of birth and year of arrival for the foreign-born. A 
sampling weight is assigned to each observation indicating the number of individuals in 
the national population represented and this weight is used in all regressions. 
 
                                                 
3 The sources for all data are given in the appendix. The basic database is also described in Montenegro and Hirn 
(2008). 
6    
 
A series of steps brings us from the raw collection of data sets to the estimation sample. 
First, we remove all self-employed people and unpaid family workers from the data, 
leaving only wage-earners. This has the advantage of increasing the comparability and 
accuracy of the earnings measures, but has the disadvantage of eliminating a large portion 
(though not all) of the informal sector from the sample—especially many agriculturists in 
the poorest countries. Second, we remove all people aged 14 or less and all people aged 
66 or greater. Third, we remove all people reporting zero wage earnings. Fourth, we 
removed the data from twelve transition countries because many of these countries were 
undergoing extraordinary instability of prices, wages, and currencies at the time the 
survey was administered
4. Fifth,  we randomly delete US-born US-residents from the 
PUMS to reduce the size of that group from about 6.13 million to about half a million, 
due to binding memory constraints in the microcomputer conducting the statistical 
analysis, and scale up each person’s sampling weight accordingly. Sixth, we drop Chad 
from the sample because the sample of US residents in the public-use data does not 
happen to contain any working-age wage-earners who report being born in Chad. Finally, 
we drop Honduras from the sample for reasons described below. 
 
The US census data were collected for the year 1999 while the surveys were in the 1990s 
and early 2000s (only India’s survey was carried out in 1999). We convert each wage 
estimate in current year local currency to current year US dollars at Purchasing Power 
Parity using factors from the World Bank (2007) and then deflate these dollar amounts to 
1999 PPP US dollars using the PPP factor deflator.
5  To the extent that real wages rose 
(or fell) relative to the US between 1999 and the year of a country’s survey, the wage 
ratios for those countries will be slightly underestimated (or overestimated). Converting 
to PPP also naturally introduces the possibility that errors in any given country’s PPP 
calculation could affect the results; note, however, that each of the 42 wage ratios we 
                                                 
4 The twelve we remove are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Belarus, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Moldova, Republic of 
Macedonia, Russia, Romania, and Slovakia. 
5 After we carried out our analysis the World Bank announced intentions to retroactively adjust the PPP factors we use, 
but these were unavailable at the time of writing. We note, however, that the most important adjustments foreseen are 
those to India’s and China’s PPP factors, both of which will tend to lower the PPP dollar-value of non-migrants’ 
earnings and therefore make the wage ratios reported here tend to underestimate the true ratios. In general, pre-2005 
PPP ratios may suffer from a failure to properly control for quality of items priced, “leading to an understatement of 
price levels in poor countries and to an overstatement of their output and income levels” (Deaton and Heston 2008). 
This tends to bias our estimated wage ratios downward. 
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calculate is independent of any data from the 41 other countries. Thus any error in any 
one country’s PPP rate does not propagate to the other estimates. 
 
2.2 Method 
 
We compare workers residing in one pair of countries at a time—the US and another 
country j ∈ J—estimating a separate wage regression for each country j. For example, we 
can use the estimated coefficients to predict the average wage of a Guatemalan-born, 
Guatemalan-educated, 35 year-old urban male wage-worker with 9 years of education 
who resides in the United States, and compare this to the predicted average wage of a 35 
year-old urban male wage-worker with 9 years of education in Guatemala. This same 
analysis is then replicated for each of the 41 other migrant-origin countries. The estimates 
for each country stand alone and are not influenced by any data quality, conceptual (e.g. 
similarity of the earnings concept), or empirical difficulties specific to any other country. 
 
The regression specification for each country j is 
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where wij is the wage of person i in country j. The first vector on the right-hand side 
describes a large number of coefficients and dummy variables reflecting levels of 
education, age, sex, and rural/urban residence. Starting with the first row,   is a 5×1 
vector of dummy variables equal to 1 if the person has completed each of five levels of 
education,
ij s
6 and   is a 9×1 vector of dummies for different age levels. ij a
7 The dummy    ij f
                                                 
6 Beyond a base group of zero years of schooling, the five categories are 1) 1-4 years, 2) 5-8 years, 3) 9-12 years, 4) 13-
16 years, and 5) 17-28 years. 
7 Beyond a base group for age 15-19, the nine age categories are 1) 20-24, 2) 25-29, 3) 30-34, 4) 35-39, 5) 40-44, 6) 45-
49, 7) 50-54, 8) 55-59, 9) 60-65 (intentionally includes 65). 
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indicates female and   indicates residence in a rural area. The  ,  ij r η δ , and ζ  are 
coefficients, while the β are 1×5 vectors of coefficients and the γ  are 1×9 vectors of 
coefficients. 
 
The other rows of the first vector, after dot product with the rightmost column vector, 
allow all of the estimated coefficients to differ between US-born US-residents, foreign-
born US residents who arrived before age 20, foreign-born US-residents who arrived at or 
after age 20, and foreign residents. The “1” in the first row of that rightmost vector 
signifies that the base group is US-born residents of the US.   (r for “resident” of 
country j) takes the value 1 if individual i resides in country j, or 0 otherwise; these are 
people born in foreign, residing in foreign.  (l for a “late” arriver) is 1 if individual i 
was born in country j, now resides in the US, and arrived in the US at or above age 20, 
and 0 otherwise.   (e for “early” arriver) takes the value 1 if individual i was born in 
country j, now resides in the US, and arrived in the US below age 20, and 0 otherwise.
r
ij I
l
ij I
e
ij I
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2.3  Estimates of Ro  
 
We now present estimated wage ratios based on coefficient estimates from regression (1). 
Figure 1 provides a schematic visual explanation of the different ratios, and Table 1 
presents the estimated ratios. These lead up to our preferred estimate of Ro in column 6 of 
Table 1. 
 
In Figure 1, the X axis shows some observable trait, such as years of education, and the w 
axis shows the wage profile associated with that trait―a profile that can take any form. 
Letting a represent the vertical height of the point with that label, a gives the average 
wage of US-born US-residents, b is the wage of foreign-born, US-educated US residents, 
c is the average wage of foreign-born, foreign-educated US residents, and d is the average 
wage of foreign residents. 
                                                 
8 The regressions also include dummy variables for the periodicity of wage reported (daily, weekly, monthly, etc.), 
suppressed here for clarity. 
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Figure 1: Schematic representation of wage ratios 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Each of these has different average wage levels in part because they are at different 
points on the wage profile in observable trait X; people in the US might have a greater 
number of years of education on average, for example, than people in the foreign country. 
Thus column 1 of Table 1 gives the ratio a/d in Figure 1; column 2 gives b/d; and column 
3 gives c/d. These first three columns do not control for any observable traits besides 
country of birth and age of arrival (that is, the coefficients β, a, δ, and ζ are constrained to 
zero, and only the coefficients η are estimated). 
 
In other words, column 1 shows the ratio between the average monthly wage of a US-
born, US-resident worker and a foreign-resident worker, without controlling for any 
observable traits. In column 2, the numerator is the average wage of a foreign-born, US-
resident worker, without controlling for any other traits. In column 3, the numerator is the 
average wage of a foreign-born, US-resident worker who arrived at or after age 20, again, 
without controlling for other traits.
9 
                                                 
9 The estimates in column 2 are closely related to those of Hendricks (2002) who uses these to adjust cross-national 
estimates of human capital for growth accounting. 
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Table 1: Estimates of wage ratios for observably identical workers (Ro) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Numerator  is:  X    X       
  US-born   X    X     
  Foreign-born     X     X   X 
  Foreign-born & educ.           
Controls       X  X  X   X
* 
 
       Conf. Interval 
for column 6 
 
           
Yemen  14.06 11.18 12.20 18.02 16.64 15.45  (5.58, 42.79)  11.43 
Nigeria  13.45 15.52 17.34 21.93 16.21 14.85  (10.28, 21.46)  7.79 
Egypt  11.98 16.00 17.36 15.89 11.97 11.92  (7.43, 19.12)  11.93 
Haiti  23.50 20.48 21.40 16.06 10.60 10.31  (7.79, 13.67)  4.19 
Cambodia  9.16 8.49 9.12 8.45 8.11 7.45  (4.66, 11.91)  6.40 
Sierra  Leone  8.35 8.06 9.29  10.92 7.61 7.43  (0.2, 280.18)  3.70 
Ghana 9.37  10.41  11.53  9.68  7.28  7.12  (1.27, 40.04)  4.22 
Indonesia  9.52 9.38  10.92 8.89 6.77 6.72  (3.39, 13.32)  3.17 
Pakistan 12.58  13.65  15.32  8.40  6.88  6.57  (4.88, 8.85)  2.95 
Venezuela  8.89 8.94 8.97 8.65 8.08 6.57  (4.18, 10.30)  3.69 
Cameroon 10.06  10.36  12.11  8.44  5.81  6.53  (2.09, 20.44)  7.38 
Vietnam  10.29 9.97 9.92 8.88 7.39 6.49  (5.56, 7.56)  3.92 
India 10.88  16.33  18.49  7.37  6.69  6.25  (5.28, 7.39)  2.96 
Jordan  6.21 7.02 7.24 7.68 6.25 5.65  (2.77, 11.50)  3.98 
Ecuador  7.29 6.17 6.01 7.89 5.75 5.16  (3.99, 6.67)  3.26 
Bolivia  5.78 5.51 5.75 7.09 5.58 5.03  (2.76, 9.18)  3.34 
Sri Lanka  9.90  11.95  12.76  7.32  5.22  4.95  (2.34, 10.49)  1.26 
Nepal 13.47  10.61  12.14  9.08  5.30  4.85  (1.45, 16.19)  4.37 
Bangladesh  6.89 6.23 6.90 6.56 4.62 4.60  (2.96, 7.14)  2.19 
Uganda 7.71  10.01  10.52  6.00  3.61  4.38  (1.31, 14.64)  2.30 
Ethiopia 13.07  12.08  13.01  6.16  4.46  4.35  (2.81, 6.73)  2.40 
Guyana  4.81 5.29 5.77 4.61 4.06 3.87  (2.06, 7.24)  1.39 
Philippines  6.19 7.38 8.27 5.63 4.44 3.82  (3.36, 4.35)  1.42 
Peru  4.43 4.11 4.29 5.01 4.08 3.79  (2.96, 4.85)  1.60 
Brazil  5.03 4.85 5.29 4.31 3.90 3.76  (2.88, 4.92)  1.66 
Jamaica  3.20 3.45 3.80 4.63 3.88 3.63  (0.67, 19.79)  1.55 
Chile  3.09 3.39 3.64 4.28 3.70 3.53  (2.17, 5.76)  1.60 
Nicaragua  4.96 3.94 4.12 5.10 3.91 3.52  (2.61, 4.75)  1.42 
Panama 3.86  4.18 4.14 4.46 3.94 3.36  (2.06, 5.49)  1.54 
Uruguay  3.22 3.66 3.72 2.72 3.26 3.10  (1.28, 7.50)  1.90 
Guatemala  6.25 4.65 4.78 4.28 3.07 2.94  (2.39, 3.61)  1.73 
Colombia  4.42 3.87 3.87 4.14 3.11 2.88  (2.40, 3.46)  1.65 
Paraguay  3.20 3.21 3.48 2.74 2.65 2.78  (0.71, 10.93)  1.10 
South  Africa  2.83 4.01 5.18 2.34 3.04 2.75  (1.45, 5.21)  0.65 
Turkey  3.15 3.48 3.86 3.55 3.03 2.68  (1.52, 4.74)  1.46 
Argentina  2.40 2.88 2.92 3.05 2.90 2.54  (1.60, 4.04)  1.37 
Mexico  3.82 2.72 2.68 3.83 2.78 2.53  (2.42, 2.65)  1.31 
Belize  3.58 3.49 3.65 2.59 2.38 2.43  (0.02, 243.65)  1.16 
Thailand  4.79 3.80 4.86 3.22 2.65 2.17  (1.29, 3.64)  1.04 
Costa  Rica  2.85 2.62 2.52 2.92 2.25 2.07  (1.22, 3.53)  1.24 
Morocco  3.48 4.06 3.81 3.02 2.37 2.00  (1.06, 3.74)  0.62 
Dominican  Rep.  3.32 2.44 2.52 3.02 2.04 1.99  (1.66, 2.39)  1.30 
           
Median 6.20  5.84  5.89  5.81 4.26 4.11    1.81 
Mean  7.27 7.38 7.99 6.88 5.43 5.11    2.99 
 
Sorted in descending order by column 6. Columns 1-3 give the ratio average wage of a worker residing in the US to the average wage of a worker 
residing in each foreign country, without controlling for observable traits besides country of birth and age of arrival. Columns 4-6 give the predicted ratio 
between the average wage of a US-resident 35 year-old male urban worker born in each country with 9 years of education acquired in each country, to the 
average wage of an observably identical worker residing in each origin country. Column 7 gives a 95% confidence interval for column 6. *Column 8 is 
identical to column 6 except the numerator contains the predicted wage for a person in the US that has completed only primary education, while the 
denominator contains the predicted wage for a person in the foreign country who has completed four years of tertiary education. 
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The next three columns of Table 1 control for observable traits (education, age, sex, and 
rural/urban) and graphically are various ways of “drilling down” through the wage 
profiles in Figure 1 to compare the predicted average wages of persons at the same point 
in observed characteristics. The specification of regression (1) allows different wage 
profiles for each of the four groups (so the curves in Figure 1 are not forced to be 
parallel). Column 4 of Table 1 gives the ratio a′/d′ in Figure 1, column 5 gives the ratio 
b′/d′, and column 6 gives the ratio c′/d′, or Ro. 
 
Ratios in the remaining columns control for education, age, gender, and rural/urban 
residence. They are based on empirical estimates of the parameters β, a, δ, ζ, and η, and 
give predicted average wage for a 35 year-old urban male with 9 years of education. In 
column 4 the numerator is once again US-born US-residents, and in column 5 it is 
foreign-born US-residents. In column 6 the numerator represents workers born in each 
country of origin and (likely) educated there, having arrived at or after age 20. These 
ratios, in boldface, are the estimates of Ro—the ratio of predicted wages for observably 
identical workers across the US border. Column 7 gives a 95% confidence interval for the 
point estimates in column 6, based on a simple F-test of coefficient restrictions in 
regression (1). The raw coefficient estimates used to calculate Table 1 are given in 
Appendix Table A1. 
 
The median estimated Ro in column 6 is around 4.0, corresponding roughly to Ethiopia, 
Peru, or Guyana. The highest estimated Ro is for Yemen at 15.45 (earning $1,940 per 
month in the US versus $126 per month in Yemen), while the lowest is for the 
Dominican Republic (earning $1,491 per month in the US versus $749 in the Dominican 
Republic).
10 The highest absolute difference in annual wage earnings is $21,722 
(Yemen), the smallest is $8,912 (Dominican Republic). The mean and median annual 
absolute differences are both just over $15,400.Comparing columns 1 and 6 reveals that 
observable individual traits typically explain about one third of international differences 
                                                 
10 The wage premia tend to be modestly lower at higher levels of education (although this is in ratios; in absolute terms 
the gap grows). This can be attributed mechanically to the fact that the partial association of wages in the US labor 
market and schooling acquired abroad (median 6.1% increase in wages per year of schooling) is typically substantially 
lower than the association of US wages and US schooling (median 12.3%) or the association of foreign wages and 
foreign schooling (median 8.2%). 
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in wages, as the median raw wage ratio is 6.2 and the median of the ratio for observably 
identical workers is 4.1.
11 
 
The enormous size of the ratios Ro, compared to wage differences created by differences 
in other wage determinants such as education, is underscored by column 8 of the table. 
This is identical to column 6 except for one change: It compares the average predicted 
wage of a foreign-born, foreign-educated, 35 year-old urban male in the US who has 
completed only primary education to the average predicted wage of a 35 year-old urban 
male in the foreign country who has completed four years of tertiary education 
(interpreting X in Figure 1 as education, column 8 thus shows the ratio c″/d″). For 
example, an average Indian worker with six years of Indian education earns about triple 
the wages working in the United States, adjusted for purchasing power, as a person with 
16 years of education earns in India. 
 
2.3  Robustness of the estimated Ro 
 
As with any empirical exercise, we make a number of assumptions. Here we discuss 
several of these assumptions and their possible effects on the magnitude of the results. 
 
Exchange rates: By using PPP exchange rates we are implicitly assuming that all 
consumption of movers occurs in the US, which substantially understates the gains to 
overall earnings for migrant families, in two ways. First, this ignores remittances. If a 
worker is in one country with nuclear family members in another, and if we assume a 
unitary household utility function, then household consumption should be deflated in the 
location where consumption occurs. This suggests at the least that all remittances should 
enter the analysis at sending country prices (official exchange rates), not PPP. Second, 
migrants, and especially temporary workers, should optimally have very high savings 
rates. A simple model of inter-temporal consumption smoothing would suggest that if a 
                                                 
11 Median: 1 – (4.11/6.20) = 33.7%. Mean: 1 – (5.11/7.27) = 29.6%. Milanovic (2008) shows that country fixed effects 
explain roughly 60 percent of all income inequality across individuals in the world, but this includes inequality due to 
differential access to capital and different levels of human capital. In contrast, our results are specific to labor income 
for workers with the same characteristics.  
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worker had access to a much higher wage rate for an explicitly temporary period they 
should optimally smooth these windfall gains over his or her lifetime. Alternatively, 
temporary migration is often modeled as driven by “target savers” who accumulate 
savings for a specific purpose (e.g. a house, business, car, wedding/marriage), 
consumption that, again, would occur in their country of origin not in the US. Much, 
perhaps most consumption of the US earnings of temporary migrants would be in their 
own country, not the US. 
 
Table 2 explores the sensitivity of the Ro estimates to the choice of exchange rate. The 
leftmost column uses PPP exchange rates and reproduces the estimates in column 6 of 
Table 1. This is equivalent to the assumption that none of the increase in earnings of 
movers is spent at origin-country prices. The rightmost column shows what Ro would be 
if official exchange rates are used, equivalent to the assumption that all of the increase in 
earnings is spent in the origin country. The two intermediate columns use two different 
weighted-average exchange rates. Column 2 assumes that roughly 20% of migrants’ 
income is spent in the origin country, a conservative estimate for Mexicans in the US.
12 
Column 3 assumes that 60% is spent at the origin, in line with estimates for male 
overseas Filipino contract workers.
13 
 
The median estimate of Ro rises from about 4 using PPP to about 5 when 20% of income 
is spent in the origin country, to above 7 when 60% of income is spent, and to 14 when 
using official exchange rates. Even the three smallest wage ratio countries at PPP are 
above 3 at 60 percent and above 5 at official exchange rates. The estimates of Ro in 
Column 6 of Table 1 are conservative in potentially substantially understating the “real” 
wage differentials based on the relevant consumption prices of movers.  
                                                 
12  Amuedo-Dorantes, Bansak, and Pozo (2005, Table 1A) find that Mexican migrant household heads in the United 
states remit 27.9% of monthly income to Mexico, a figure that includes non-remitters and does not include repatriated 
savings. 
13 Semyonov and Gorodzeisky (2005, Table 1) find that male overseas Filipino workers remit 60.3% of monthly 
income to the Philippines, while females remit 45.0%. 
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Table 2: Sensitivity to choice of exchange rate 
 
Estimates of Ro using PPP exchange rates (leftmost column), official exchange rates (rightmost column), or 
weighted averages of the two (intermediate columns) 
 
    % of income consumed in country of origin 
Representative 
countries 
Placement of 
countries in the 
distribution 
baseline Ro  
0% 
(PPP-
Column 6 
of Table 1) 
20% 60%  100% 
(Official 
exchange 
rate) 
        
Yemen  15.45 16.05 17.40 19.00 
Nigeria  14.85 16.79 22.71 35.08 
Egypt 
Three highest 
11.92 13.49 18.33 28.58 
Cameroon 6.53  7.56  11.06  20.57 
Vietnam 6.49  7.75  12.72  35.42 
India 
Around 75
th 
percentile  6.25 7.44  12.01  31.15 
Guyana 3.87  4.58  7.30  17.88 
Philippines 3.82  4.53  7.16  17.09 
Perú 
Around Median 
3.79 4.29 5.83 9.08 
Colombia  2.88 3.33 4.81 8.67 
Paraguay 2.78  3.26  4.94  10.21 
South Africa 
Around 25th 
percentile  2.75 3.17 4.55 8.08 
Costa  Rica  2.07 2.31 3.00 4.27 
Morocco  2.00 2.28 3.19 5.33 
Dominican Rep. 
Three Lowest 
1.99 2.28 3.24 5.55 
        
Median of all 42 countries  4.11  4.92  7.23  13.90 
 
 
Reliability and comparability of reported earnings: Research comparing multiple sources 
of income data at the individual level suggest that self-reported income is an unbiased 
estimator of true income, both in rich countries (Bound and Krueger (1991)) and in poor 
countries (Akee (2007a)). There is less certainty about comparability. Wage data for the 
US reflect total earnings from all jobs, whereas wage data for the 42 developing countries 
in our sample reflect wages from the respondent’s principal occupation. For the vast 
majority of formal-sector wage earners in the sample we nevertheless expect wage 
earnings from the principal occupation to closely reflect total wage earnings.  
 
Furthermore, wage data for the United States reflect gross earnings before taxes, and we 
expect that most people responding to a general question about their wages or earnings 
would have provided gross wages on most of the country surveys, but for a handful of 
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countries it may be that the responses reflect after-tax wages.
14 If respondents provided 
net-of-tax instead of gross wages this would result in some upward bias to our estimated 
Ro. This bias will be small, however, if it is present at all. Formal-sector income taxes are 
on the order of 5% in most developing countries (Easterly and Rebelo (1993)). For the 
median ratio of 3.92, for example, a 5% underestimation of the denominator means that 
the corrected ratio is 3.73.  
 
Reported wages in the US census do not include non-wage benefits, which are likely to 
be a larger fraction of total compensation in the US than in many of the countries 
examined here. Again most of these considerations of comparability would tend to make 
Ro underestimate the cross-border ratio of total compensation. 
 
Regression specification: Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2006) question the validity of 
assumptions underlying the traditional Mincer functional form, which helps motivate our 
choice of the much more flexible specification in (1). We also conducted the same 
analysis using (i) the traditional Mincer specification and (ii) augmented Mincer 
specification with square and cubic terms and interactions allowing a flexible 
approximation of the functional form of more complex education-wage and age-wage 
relationships. All the variations in functional form we experimented with gave almost 
identical overall results for the one comparison group we chose
15 and hence are omitted. 
 
The reported estimates ratios Ro are just factual summary statistics about wage data, the 
ratios of the predicted conditional means of two wages of two different groups—people 
who are the same in the characteristics in the two samples—on opposite sides of the US 
border. These wage ratio estimates are almost certainly conservative and are robust to the 
functional form used to estimate the wage profiles used in computing the conditional 
means.  
                                                 
14 In a small number of the countries (such as Yemen) the survey explicitly requests after-tax earnings, and in a few of 
the others (such as Chile) custom may dictate that formal sector “wages” refer to after-tax earnings unless otherwise 
specified. The text of the wage question from each survey is in the Appendix. 
15 Which is not to say: “functional form doesn’t make a difference” in estimating wage profiles. Many of the functional 
form assumptions affect the slopes of the wage profiles in Figure 1, but if we are “drilling down” at a single point near 
the middle of the education distribution (as opposed to say, comparing wage differentials across countries) one can 
imagine a good deal of robustness even if functional form does matter for other questions.  
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These facts themselves have never before been recorded on such a wide scale. As with 
most empirical work in economics, all the theory, and controversy, comes in interpreting 
these facts. The wage data represent the outcomes of the workings of spatially separated 
labor markets, which themselves are the result of the choices of employers in each of 
those markets, choices of workers in each of those markets, and choices of workers to 
(attempt to) move across markets, and all of these choices are constrained by institutions 
and policies—including policies about crossing the border.  
 
 
3  Assessing wage ratios for fully equivalent workers 
 
The preceding estimates of Ro could be biased estimates of what we term the “place 
premium” the cross-border ratio of wages earned by two people of equal intrinsic 
productivity. In particular, we are interested in measuring Re for the marginal person who 
would cross the border if policy barriers were incrementally relaxed. As we will show, Ro 
overestimates Re principally to the extent that migrants are positively selected on 
unobservable determinants of wage. If, through choices of movers, employers or policy, 
the workers in the US would have had above average earnings in their home-country 
labor market because of unobserved wage determinants not included in our regressions, 
then the ratio Ro overestimates Re.  
 
In this section, we first describe the form of this bias. We then present new evidence from 
a variety of sources on the degree of this bias. We proceed to triangulate our findings 
with the existing evidence. Finally, we calculate Re using the actual distributions of 
residuals under different assumptions about the degree of selectivity suggested by the 
preceding evidence. While no one piece of this evidence is definitive, the preponderance 
of the evidence suggests that, among low to moderate skilled workers, the selection is 
positive, but not very strongly so.
16  The extent to which the wage ratios of observably 
                                                 
16 This is not a general claim about “selectivity” in mobility decisions as we are not examining college graduates, much 
less the highly skilled “superstar” movers such as economics professors and our data does not distinguish between legal 
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identical workers overstates the wage ratios of equal-productivity marginal movers is 
generally modest, with Ro/Re falling in the range 1.0 to 1.5 in all cases examined. 
 
3.1  Migrant selection and estimating Re 
 
Suppose that each potential migrant has an idiosyncratic wage at the origin (home 
country h), wage at the destination (country d), and cost of moving, broadly considered, 
which includes the obstacles and costs created by policy. The marginal migrant will be 
one for whom the wage gain to movement just equals the moving cost: 
 
    ( )
i i
h h
i
d d w w π μ μ ln ~ ln ln ~ ln ln = + − + . (2) 
 
Here,  d w  is the average wage at the destination earned by a person from the origin 
country for a given set of observable traits, and  h w  is the average wage earned by an 
observably identical person in the home country of origin. 
i
d μ ~  is the unobservable 
difference between the wage that will be earned at the destination by a marginal 
observably identical migrant i and the average previous observably identical migrant.   
is the unobservable difference between the wage that this same person would earn in the 
home country of origin and the average earnings of an observably identical person at the 
origin. Finally,   is that person’s cost of moving.  
i
h μ ~
i π
 
After taking expectations of both sides of (2), assume that the marginal migrant can 
expect roughly the same wage outcomes as previous observably identical migrants: 
[ ] 0 ~ ln ≈
i
d E μ . Taking the exponent of both sides, letting [ ] ( )
i
h h E μ μ ~ ln exp ≡ , and letting 
[ ] ( )
i
e E R π exp ≡ , we have 
    e h
h
d
o R
w
w
R μ = ≡ . (3) 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
and undocumented workers in the US. It is possible that selectivity is a much larger issue for legally admitted and/or 
higher-skill workers, who are a focus of the “skill price” approach in Rosenzweig (2006). 
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The left-hand side of (3) is the destination-to-origin wage ratio for an observably 
identical worker—what we call Ro. On the right-hand side, Re is the “place premium”, the 
wage ratio for an equivalent intrinsic productivity worker across the border. The term  h μ  
reflects selection of the marginal migrant from the distribution of unobservable 
determinants of earnings in the migrant’s home country. If he or she comes from above 
the conditional mean of the unobservable determinants of earnings, then  1 > h μ  and the 
ratio  h d o w w R =  overestimates the place premium Re. 
 
As a heuristic description, we are not estimating the “average treatment effect” or the 
wage gain if the “typical” Peruvian worker were involuntarily moved to the US labor 
market. In this case one would worry that the wages of the actual movers would overstate 
the gain to the average Peruvian worker, if moved, because movers had self-selected 
because their wages in the US would be high—e.g. they had language skills or relatives 
who could locate jobs—so that the average wage of the existing movers would be in the 
tail of the distribution of unobserved determinants of wages in the US. But we are 
interested in the marginal voluntary mover if the distribution of moving costs were 
incrementally proportionally reduced for all potential movers. In this case we assume that 
the difference of the marginal mover and existing movers in the US labor market is small. 
But it is still the case that both the existing movers and the marginal mover might have 
had much higher wages had they remained in the home market and hence comparing the 
marginal worker by comparing the average of existing (late arriving) movers to non-
movers gets badly wrong the wages the mover would have earned had they remained. So 
even though we know the wages of movers in the US and the wages of non-movers in 
their home country, the question is: What would have been the wages of the movers had 
they not moved? 
 
3.2  Sensitivity to assumptions about selection 
 
What degree of selection would be necessary to produce substantial differences between 
Ro and Re? Figure 2 shows sample kernel density plots of the predicted distributions of 
formal sector wages for 35 year-old urban males with 9 years of education for (i) US-
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born US residents, (ii) foreign-born US-resident “early arrivers” (before age 20), (iii) 
foreign-born US-resident “late arrivers” (at or after age 20, thus almost all educated 
abroad), and (iv) foreign residents, for four representative countries: Mexico, Vietnam, 
Ghana, and Haiti. 
 
Ro, as estimated in column 6 of table 1, is essentially the ratio of the means of the last two 
of these groups (“late arrivers” versus “non-movers”). Hence Figure 2 shows the 
distribution around the vertical slices through the wage profiles in Figure 1 (as the lines 
in that figure are the regression function) and illustrates that the distribution of “late 
arrivers” and “non-movers” are spaced far apart—in some cases mostly non-overlapping. 
Even comparing the 50
th percentile of the “late arriver” distribution to the upper 
percentiles of the “non-mover” distribution, consistent with strong positive selection, 
would still produce very large wage ratios.  
 
What should be our prior about the degree of selectivity of existing movers from their 
home country residual distribution of wages from the countries under consideration?  The 
observed degree of selectivity is the result of a variety of factors in the movement 
decisions of individuals. That is, among the low to moderate skill workers the marginal 
migrant has not been purposefully “selected” for entry into the US based on 
characteristics that are likely positively correlated with the unobservable component of 
wages in the home country. This is likely true of at least some people reading this paper, 
who obtained visas or citizenship based on “extraordinary” or “exceptional” ability, or of 
H1-B visa holders who are chosen based on demand from employers, but is less true of 
the typical high school or less educated Mexican or Bolivian or Vietnamese worker in the 
sample. 
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Figure 2: Kernel densities of the unexplained component of wages 
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The observed selectivity in equilibrium of actual movers is based on a combination of 
individual specific characteristics which determine the propensity to move, such as 
variations in the policy based constraints to movement, variations in the ease of evading 
those policies and entering the country and worked as an undocumented worker, 
networks or connections of friends and relatives in the US that lower the job search 
and/or psychic costs of moving, the utility loss to being abroad, and so on. Some of these 
factors driving the movers’ decisions might be correlated with home country wages, 
some not. All else equal, lower home country wages would lead to a higher propensity to 
move. There is nothing about the theory or practice of labor mobility across the US 
border that guarantees movers will be strongly positively selected, especially in the    
 
relevant sense here of moderate skill workers coming from high percentiles of the 
distribution of wages in the home country conditional on observed characteristics.
17 
 
Hence we believe there is scant existing theoretical or empirical basis to form priors that 
selection on unobservables from the countries and for the workers under consideration is 
negative, neutral, or positive, much less of its magnitude
18.  We move ahead by providing 
several distinct ways of estimating the degree of positive selection, from different 
methods and countries. None of this evidence allows a definitive, ironclad point estimate 
of Re for any country. But it is sufficient to allow estimation of a reasonable prior for Re 
in several of the countries we examine, as well as to establish reasonable priors for the 
degree of selection and the magnitude of Re for typical countries. 
 
3.3  New evidence on selection: Panel data 
 
One direct approach to estimating the point of the home country distribution of wages 
from which migrants come is to look at migrants’ wages before they move and compare 
the residual distribution of wages of those who will later be migrants to those who do not 
migrate. Existing, publicly-available data allow such an exercise in the Philippines, 
Mexico, and South Africa. 
 
The Labor Force Survey of the Philippines allows analysis of this kind. The nationally-
representative, rotating panel design of quarterly surveys conducted between January 
2001 and April 2003 allow construction of seven separate panels of several thousand 
                                                 
17 In fact, a common objection to current US immigration policy is that it has been based far too little on productivity 
related characteristics and far too much on characteristics unrelated to productivity, such as having a relative in the US 
which has led to a declining “quality” of allowed migrant in terms of observables (e.g. Borjas 1987), on top of which 
the net result of enforcement of existing policy is that in many instances the marginal migrant is likely in the US as 
entirely undocumented or not in compliance with their original visa entry status.  
18 It is not even clear what the relevant stance of prevailing “methodological skepticism” about econometrics and 
identification would be in this case. One might frame the question such that the null is “no selection” and hence in the 
absence of ironclad evidence to the contrary the default is that there is no selection and hence observed estimates of Ro 
should not be adjusted for selection at all. On the other hand, one could frame the null as Re = 1 for all countries (or the 
“no policy barriers” level)—ignoring evidence of gains to migration and without any theoretical rationale—and then 
demand ironclad evidence about the magnitude of selection to be swayed from this null. But reconciling Re = 1 for all 
countries with the observed Ro from Table 1 requires asserting a complex set of priors, such that the magnitude of 
selection for each country is just exactly what is required to reconcile this null and the observed Ro. Asserting an 
arbitrary set of priors and then demanding perfect evidence to change those priors hardly seems a methodologically 
defensible stance. . 
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households lasting nine months each. Wages and basic traits of each worker are collected 
at the beginning of the panel, and it can be determined whether each worker left the 
Philippines by nine months later.
19 In these data, there are observed wages for 64,172 
different workers at the start of all the panels taken together aged 15 to 65 with an 
observed wage. 277 of these people had left the Philippines by the time the household 
was visited again nine months later. We estimate a wage profile as close as possible to 
regression (1), given the constraints of the data,
20 and calculate the residual.  
 
Figure 3 shows a kernel density plot of the residual in initial wages comparing 
subsequent movers to non-movers. The mean wage residual of the movers lies at the 54
th 
percentile of the distribution of unobserved determinants of earnings for non-mover. To 
the degree that this is representative of selectivity of Filipinos departing for the United 
States, this suggests that  h μ  in equation (3) is 1.08 (95% confidence interval (1.02, 
1.15)). Since Ro for the Philippines is 3.8, using this  h μ  would imply that for the 
Philippines Re ≈ 3.5. (The median mover comes from the 58
th percentile of non-movers.) 
 
The structure of the Mexican Labor Force Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y 
Empleo) since 2005 allows a nearly identical analysis. Each household that enters the 
panel is visited five times, allowing observation of workers over a full 12 months. As 
long as the household can be recontacted in each wave, it can be determined whether or 
not any household members left the country during the period of observation. The 
                                                 
19 Construction of the panel requires a nontrivial matching procedure because the survey does not retain strictly unique 
household identification numbers over time. Households that are retained in the rotating sample between two periods 
do retain the same identification number, but new households rotated into the sample are given identification numbers 
that, in a small number of cases, could be recycled identification numbers of households that could not be contacted 
and were dropped from the panel (between 6% and 8% of the households per wave). For this reason, we match 
households across time on the household identification number plus a code number reflecting the demographic 
composition of the household. This allows matching of households to a high degree of confidence. Within the matched 
households, subsequent migrants are identified by comparing wage-earners’ age and gender at the start of the panel to 
migrant household members’ age and gender at the end of the panel. While it is quite possible for this to generate 
ambiguity about which of (say) two people in the same household with identical age and gender became the emigrant, 
this did not happen to occur in the 277 cases of subsequent migrants with initially observed wages in this sample. 
Despite the minor limitations of the data, therefore, we are very confident of high-quality matching. And even if 
matching were poor, it would be unclear why false matches would tend to generate bias in the results through any 
correlation with the degree of migrant selection. 
20 The age dummies are identical to those used in regression (1). The education dummies are in seven categories: 1) no 
schooling (base group), 2) primary school attained, 3) primary school completed, 4) secondary school attained, 5) 
secondary school completed, 6) tertiary school attained, 7) tertiary school completed. The regression and the kernel 
density plot are weighted by sampling weights. 
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Mexico data from 2005 to 2008 thus contain wage information for 274,955 workers, 569 
of which are known to have left Mexico by 12 months later. Again we regress the natural 
logarithm of wages on the same set of observable traits closely analogous to equation 
(1)
21 and calculate residuals. 
 
Figure 3 compares kernel density plots for residual wages earned by non-emigrants to 
those earned by subsequent emigrants. These nationally-representative data reveal that 
the average emigrant comes from the 56
th percentile of residual wages, suggesting that 
Ro/Re = 1.03 (with a 95% confidence interval of (0.96, 1.12)), so that Re ≈ 2.46. (The 
median emigrant comes from the 50
th percentile of non-migrants.) This calculation for 
Mexico is important but should not be seen as representative of selection processes for 
other countries that are more distant, where language barriers are more important, and 
where diasporas are smaller, all of which might affect the degree of selection. 
 
 
                                                 
21 The only difference is that the categorical education dummies represent 1) no schooling (base group), 2) less than 
primary, 3) primary, 4) secondary, 5) preparatorio or bachillerato, 6) normal school (teachers’ college) degree, 7) 
technical degree, 8) professional degree, 9) master’s degree, and 10) doctorate. 
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Figure 3: Selection on unobservable wage correlates in household panel data 
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Corroborative but more limited panel data evidence comes from South Africa, where the 
Cape Area Panel Study gathered wage and international migration data on 2,864 young 
adults (aged 14-22) in Cape Town, South Africa followed from 2002 to 2006. These data 
have the advantage that each person was followed for a full four years, but the 
disadvantage that they cover only young adults. Of those who began the study in 2002, 
61 individuals had both left South Africa by 2006 and reported a wage in South Africa 
prior to departure. We calculate the residual log wage controlling for age, education, and    
 
sex,
22 but do not control for race, and compare this residual for those who did not leave 
South Africa to the residual for those who did (Figure 3). 
 
In these Cape Town data, the average migrant comes from the 55
th percentile of the 
distribution of unobserved determinants of wages among non-migrants.
23 This finding is 
notable because South Africa is a case where selection of emigrants on wage-related 
traits unobserved in our earlier regressions (especially race) might be presumed very 
large. Among young adults, positive selection on unobservables is only moderate, and 
while the sample is not representative of workers of all ages, it is unclear why selection 
of somewhat older workers would differ dramatically from that of young adults. If it does 
not, our estimate of Ro = 2.75 for South Africa likely overstates Re by a factor of about 
1.20 (95% confidence interval (1.01, 1.41)), so that Re would be roughly 2.3.
24 (The 
median migrant comes from the 60
th percentile of non-migrants.) 
 
One important drawback of this origin country-based household survey approach is that 
the data inherently omit information on the emigration of workers whose entire 
household emigrated and therefore was dropped from the home country-based panel of 
households. It is not obvious, however, why selection patterns for whole-household 
emigrants would differ radically from those for partial-household emigrants. Thus the 
degree of selection observed for partial-household emigrants is informative to shape our 
priors about the degree of selection among all emigrants. 
 
                                                 
22 We include a full set of dummies for each age at which the wage was observed (14-26), one dummy for each year of 
schooling, and a dummy for sex. We omit a rural/urban dummy as that is already held constant; the sampling universe 
is Cape Town. The regression and kernel density plot are weighted by the “young adult weight”, which adjusts for the 
sample design, household nonresponse, and young adult nonresponse. The regression also includes a set of dummies 
for the year in which the reported wage was earned (to control for inflation). 
23 The mean residual log pre-migration wage among migrants weighted by sampling weight is 0.145. The 55
th 
percentile of the wage residual, weighted by the sampling weight, is 0.142. While the study does not report the 
destination of the migrants, 79% of the migrants are described as “white” even though whites are just 13% of the non-
migrant sample. This strongly suggests that the destination of most emigrants was a rich country such as the United 
Kingdom, Canada, Australia, or the United States. This is verified by other research (e.g. Shaw 2007, p. 8) and by the 
government of South Africa (e.g. in Statistics South Africa [2005], Documented Migration 2003, Report No. 03-51-03. 
Pretoria: Statistics South Africa). 
24 When the same regression is re-run with a dummy indicating which workers subsequently became migrants, the 
coefficient on this dummy is 0.179 (with a standard error of 0.085), and e
0.179 = 1.196. 
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A second drawback is that there is no wage observation for people who were not 
employed prior to departure. To the extent that people who emigrate are any less likely to 
be employed prior to emigrating, this not a major concern if the purpose of the exercise is 
to place an upper bound on the degree of positive selection: including them would only 
make selection more negative. To the extent that emigrants are greatly more likely to be 
employed prior to emigrating than nonmigrants, the degree of positive selection would be 
understated. But we see no evidence that this is a major generalized phenomenon in the 
Philippines or Mexico. 
 
3.4  New evidence on selection: Wage histories of movers 
 
Panel wage data on international migrants are scarce. Somewhat more common are data 
on the wage histories of international migrants. The Mexican Migration Project and Latin 
American Migration Project have collected work histories of several thousand migrants 
from a variety of Latin American countries. These include a datum for each migrant 
household head or spouse on that person’s last wage in the country of origin. Because the 
surveys collect identical data on large numbers of nonmigrant households as well, this 
allows comparison of migrants’ last observed wage in the home country to that of 
nonmigrants, holding observable traits constant.
25 
 
                                                 
25 The raw data do not indicate a year in which the last home-country wage was earned, but the labor history of each 
individual allows determination of the last year in which each respondent reports working in the home country. Based 
on this we deflate each last home-country wage to constant currency units for the year 2000, using the Consumer Price 
Index for each country from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2008. We use only individuals with 
wage observations after 1980 (or after 1991 in the case of Nicaragua, due to a preceding hyperinflation). While the 
original wages are reported in several different periodicities (hourly, weekly, etc.) we convert to monthly wages by 
assuming an 8-hour workday and 6-day workweek. For 15 individuals we impute the missing periodicity based on the 
magnitude of reported wage. For Peru we omit migrants who went to countries other than the US, Mexico, Spain, or 
Costa Rica. 
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Table 3: Estimates of Re for in Latin America from wage histories 
 
 Mexico  Guate- 
mala 
Nica-
ragua. 
Costa 
Rica 
Dom. 
Rep. 
Haiti Peru 
         
Number  of  obs.  8,102  552 1,947 1,535 1,046  405  780 
   of which migrants  936  34  173  97  99  20  18 
   surveyed abroad  140  0  81  21  50  0  0 
         
Typical migrant percentile in distribution of non-migrants' unobserved component of wages 
   Mean migrant:  54  47  53  61  51  60  69 
   Median migrant:  49  54  50  55  50  56  70 
 
Ro  2.53 2.94 3.52 2.07 1.99  10.31 3.79 
Re  2.35 3.08 3.28 1.68 1.87 7.84 2.61 
Ro/Re  1.07 0.96 1.07 1.23 1.06 1.32 1.45 
         
Coefficient  on    0.020   –0.281 –0.552 –0.235     
   ‘surveyed abroad’  (0.098)    (0.174)  (0.252)  (0.199)     
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
As above, we regress the log of last home-country wage on a set of dummies describing 
age, education, sex, and classification of residence as rural or urban.
26 We calculate the 
residuals from these regressions and compare them for migrant versus nonmigrant heads 
of household and spouses. 
 
Table 3 summarizes these calculations. The average residual for movers is in the 50
th to 
60
th percentile of the distribution of residuals for non-movers in Mexico, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, and Haiti. For Peru it lies roughly in the 
70
th percentile. The exponent of the coefficient on the ‘migrant’ dummy in these 
regressions is an estimate of  h μ . Using equation (3), this and the estimate of Ro allows 
the construction of an estimate of Re for each country. For all but one country, Ro is 
indeed an overestimate of Re. The ratio Ro/ Re is less than 1.23 for five of the seven 
countries; it is 1.32 for Haiti and 1.45 for Peru.
                                                 
26 The age dummies are identical to those used in regression (1). A dummy is included for each single year of education 
between 0 and 24. The Peru and Haiti data contain only urban observations; the Guatemala data contain only rural 
observations. The regressions include a dummy signifying that the respondent was contacted in the destination country 
rather than in the origin country. The regressions also include the year of the last domestic wage and the square of that 
year, to account for any tendency of wages recalled from further into the past to systematically differ from those 
recalled more recently. Age is measured at the time the wage was earned; education is measured at the time of the 
survey (but is unlikely to have changed greatly over time for the vast majority of these adults). 
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Figure 4: Wage-history evidence on migrant selection: kernel densities of log home-
country predicted wage for 35 year-old urban male with 9 years of schooling 
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Figure 4 presents kernel density plots of the log wage regression residuals for four 
countries in Table 3. Each plot compares the distributions of unobservable home-country 
wage determinants among migrants and non-migrants. 
 
This method has two drawbacks. First, many of the migrant interviewees are contacted in 
the country of origin, meaning that they are return migrants whose last observed wage in 
the home country occurs after migration, not before migration. If there is negative 
selection of return migrants this could exert downward bias on the estimates of the degree 
of positive selection. In four of the countries, however, substantial numbers of the 
interviewees are contacted in the destination country (row 3 of Table 4), meaning that 
they are not return migrants and their last home wage must have occurred prior to 
migration. Each regression includes a dummy variable identifying these individuals, and 
the coefficient on this dummy (bottom of Table 4) is never positive and significant. This    
 
suggests that any negative selection of return migrants does not substantially shape these 
estimates. 
 
A second drawback is that the survey samples are not nationally representative. The 
Mexican Migration Project and the Latin American Migration Project by an 
“ethnosurvey” method, in which target communities are chosen as subjectively 
representative of common migration processes by knowledgeable fieldworkers, and only 
within these communities are samples statistically representative. Massey and Zenteno 
(2000), however, compare a wide variety of household traits in data gathered by the 
Mexican Migration Project to data from a rigorously nationally representative survey of 
Mexico and find that biases introduced by the ethnosurvey method are “substantively 
unimportant.” Nevertheless, the estimates in Table 4 are better considered guidance 
regarding reasonable priors about the degree of migrant selection on unobservables, 
rather than definitive point estimates of the degree of selection. 
 
3.5  Existing microeconomic evidence on selection 
 
Only three existing studies of which we are aware estimate the precise degree of selection 
on unobserved determinants of earnings for emigrants from developing countries.  
 
The only “experimental” evidence we know of is McKenzie, Gibson, and Stillman (2009) 
which compares wages of actual movers from Tonga who were randomly chosen from a 
pool of those who applied and were eligible for temporary employment in New Zealand. 
Their data and method allow estimate of Ro and Re, and find positive selection on 
observables such that Re is 4.91 while Ro is 6.14 and hence Ro/Re = 1.25.
27  
                                                 
27 They take study New Zealand’s Pacific Access Category residence visa, which is designed to allow a limited number 
of citizens of Tonga (and three other island states) to settle in New Zealand each year via a random lottery. Any person 
age 18-45 who is a citizen and natural of the four PAC countries may register for the lottery, and among those 
registered a certain number are randomly allocated the chance to apply for residence. In their sample, the mean weekly 
income of Tongan non-applicants to the lottery is NZ$70. The OLS estimate of the income gain to migration—which 
controls only for education, age, sex, height, and birth on Tonga’s principal island—is NZ$360 per week. The 
experimental estimate is NZ$274. Controlling for observables, then, the wage ratio Ro is (70+360)/70 = 6.14, while the 
true wage ratio Re controlling for both observables and unobservables is (70+274)/70 = 4.91. In other words, the 
predicted wage ratios of observational equivalent workers overstates the true ratio of selected movers by a factor of 
6.14/4.91 = 1.25.  
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Gould and Moav (2008) (Figure 4) use nationally-representative panel data from Israel to 
suggest that emigrants are typically drawn from somewhat below the 50
th percentile of 
the unobserved determinants of earnings—controlling for age, education, ethnicity, and 
native status. While the data they present do not allow an exact calculation of this 
percentile, they show that emigration rates are higher in the percentiles of the distribution 
of unobserved wage determinants below 50 than above 50.
28
 
 
Fernández-Huertas Moraga (2008), using a panel of nationally-representative household 
survey data from Mexico, finds that movers come from just below the 50
th percentile of 
the unobserved determinants of earnings. This suggests that the Ro for Mexico slightly 
underestimates Re. For the present purpose this is very similar to the findings on Mexico 
we report. 
 
These estimates agree well with our new evidence above and the three together suggest a 
ratio Ro/ Re between 0.9 and 1.25. 
 
3.6  Macroeconomic evidence 
 
Another way of assessing the bias induced by selection of migrants is to compare our 
individual based estimates with aggregate estimates. A core question in the economic 
growth literature is how much of the observed income differentials across countries are 
due to differences in the accumulation of factors—physical and human capital versus 
country specific productivity (e.g. Hall and Jones (1999), Caselli (2005)). There are two 
important implications of this literature for our results.  
                                                 
28 Akee (2007b) finds some degree of positive selection on unobservables for emigrants from Micronesia, but the data 
presented in the paper do not allow calculation of where this places them in the distribution of the unobserved 
determinants of earnings for nonmigrants. There is additional, but less reliable evidence comparing destination-country 
incomes among migrant streams that plausibly differ in their basis and degree of selection. Cortes (2004) finds that 
refugees who arrived in the US between 1975 and 1980 had 6% lower earnings in 1980 than economic migrants who 
arrived in the same period—controlling for education, age, language ability, marital status, and region of residence. 
This means that either (i) if refugees are much less positively selected on unobservables than other migrants, then the 
selection bias in our estimates of Re is not large, and is not far above 1.1, or (ii) refugees are selected on unobservables 
as much as other migrants, in which case their earnings relative to other migrants are not informative about the degree 
of bias that selection produces in our estimates. 
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First, if our wage ratios comparing observably identical workers are biased upward by the 
positive selection of migrants, then one would expect our estimates to be typically much 
higher than the macroeconomic estimates of the relative productivities of adjusted human 
capital, which are much less subject to this bias. Hall and Jones (1998) and Hall and 
Jones (1999) estimate a decomposition of countries’ relative output per worker relative to 
the US into physical capital stocks, human capital, and country-specific productivity. The 
agreement is striking between our wage ratio Ro and the Hall and Jones growth 
accounting estimates of the relative marginal product of human-capital-equivalent 
workers for the 37 countries which have both. For these countries our median wage ratio 
Ro estimate in Table 1 is 3.82 and the mean (less four countries) is 4.53. The median 
estimate of the ratio of marginal products of human capital adjusted labor from Hall and 
Jones (1999) is 3.07, and the mean 3.92. 
 
That is, Ro typically overestimates the Hall and Jones ratio by a factor of 1.25 (in 
medians) or 1.16 (when averages are taken without four outliers)
29 or at most 1.38 with 
means for all countries. This macro/micro gap, which is consistent with the 
macroeconomic differences not being affected by self-selected migrants, corresponds 
closely to the typical degree of selection bias we report in the preceding sections. This 
close general agreement across 37 countries is particularly striking as they are calculated 
by completely unrelated methods from completely unrelated data.
30   
 
 
 
                                                 
29 The four outliers, Egypt, Jordan, Venezuela, and Yemen, are countries for which Hall and Jones suggest the human 
capital adjusted gaps are much smaller than our estimated wage gaps, including estimates, in part because the HJ 
estimates are that total factor productivity in Yemen and Jordan is roughly equal to that in the US. 
30 The rank correlation between the two estimates is .41. The raw correlation without the four outliers mentioned above 
and Uganda is .75.  
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Table 5:  Comparison of estimated wage ratios of observably equivalent workers to 
Hall and Jones growth accounting estimates of the relative marginal product of 
human capital adjusted labor for 37 countries 
 
Row    Median 
Mean 
(w/o four 
outliners) 
Mean 
 
I  Ro estimates from Column 6, Table 1 for the 37 overlapping 
countries  3.82 4.53 5.11 
II  Ratios of marginal product of human capital equivalent 
labor, US to country  3.07 3.92 3.69 
III  Ratio of row I (preferred Ro estimate) to row II (growth 
accounting estimate)  1.25 1.16 1.38 
 
IV  Ratio of United States A to country A from Hall and Jones  2.44  2.90  2.71 
V  Proportion of cross-national difference in human capital 
adjusted labor due to differences in A (ratio IV to II)  0.80 0.74 0.74 
 
Sources:  Author’s calculations and Hall and Jones (1998) (Table 7), Hall and Jones (1999). 
 
 
Our micro-data based waged numbers also agree closely with the macroeconomic 
estimates of Hendricks (2002), who finds that even after controlling for cross-country 
differences in physical capital and both observable and unobservable human capital, GDP 
per capita in the United States is three times higher than in the average low-income 
country and eight times higher than in the poorest countries.
31  
 
A second important implication of these results is that the large majority of the cross-
national gap in marginal products of workers with equivalent human capital is due to 
generalized productivity differences, not physical capital. This has consequences for the 
expected welfare gains of migration for people in the destination country: If the 
differences are mostly productivity (“A”) and country-specific “A” is purely non-rival, 
then there is little “factor shallowing” effect that would reduce wages for all existing 
workers by lowering the capital-labor ratio with labor inflows. 
 
In fact, row III of Table 6 shows that the typical ratio of factor productivities (A) is 2.44, 
which is roughly 80 percent of the observed wage (or marginal product) ratio. Caselli 
(2005) reviews the literature on growth decompositions and shows that, in the standard 
                                                 
31 Hendricks (2002) compares earnings of observably identical workers from different countries in the United States to 
estimate the unobservable portion of human capital across countries, but his analysis is otherwise macroeconomic. 
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models, it is typical for physical and human capital differences to account for less than 
50% of differences in per-worker output. As Easterly (2004) points out, in “productivity 
world” factors move to higher productivity locations, as opposed to “factor world” in 
which places with scarce factors attract more factors. In “productivity world” the gains to 
movers are not offset by losses to existing residents. 
 
3.7  Selection and migrant outcomes at the destination 
 
Immigrants’ wage outcomes at the destination may contain information about the degree 
of selection from the origin. If an immigrant typically earns a different wage than the 
observably identical native, this is the net effect of two conflicting forces: 1) the 
unobservable traits (e.g. “pluck” or ambition or entrepreneurial ability) that would have 
made the mover also earn higher wages than the observably identical person back home, 
and 2) how transferable those traits are from one country to another. Basically, if the 
migration process were producing people with tremendous “pluck” then, unless pluck 
evaporates at the border or there are large wage costs to being foreign-born in the US 
labor market, movers should tend make more than observably identical US residents. 
 
Suppose that  ( ν μ θ ln ln ln ln
* − + = h d w w ) , where  d w  is again the average wage of an 
immigrant at the destination controlling for observable traits, and   is the average wage 
of a native at the destination controlling for the same observable traits. 
* w
θ  is reflects the 
degree to which having above-average wages for one’s observable traits at the origin 
translates into having above-average wages at the destination. A low θ  means that most 
of what makes one person in the origin country earn more than the average of observably 
identical people “evaporates” when that person moves, and a high θ  means that it is 
mostly preserved when that person moves. The constant ν  captures any overall 
disadvantage of being a migrant: fewer connections, language difficulties, tacit 
knowledge about the job market, and so on. This gives 
 
    * w
w
e
d
h θ
ν
μ = . (4) 
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Figure 2 suggests that immigrants’ distributions of unobservable wage determinants do 
not greatly differ from those of natives; the ratio 
* w wd  is not typically far from unity. 
Indeed, across the 42 countries, the mean ratio is 0.97, standard deviation 0.024, median 
0.97, minimum 0.92 (Nepal), and maximum 1.03 (South Africa). As Hendricks (2002) 
observes in his “correction” of cross-national estimates of human capital for education 
quality differentials, the fact that migrant earnings in the US do not greatly differ from 
native-born earnings suggests that either 1) positive selection  h μ  among low to moderate 
skilled migrants is modest or 2) there is massive evaporation of unobserved wage 
determinants at the border. 
 
We can take this a step further and estimate selection based on different assumptions 
about the evaporation of unobservable wage determinants and the costs of being foreign. 
Bolivians in the United States are close to the average as 
* w wd = 0.96. Figure 6 
combines the various elements of equation 4 to yield implications about selection h μ . If 
the unobservable determinants of wages are partially transferable across borders (θ = 
0.5), then the degree of selection at the origin does not rise above 1.5 unless the overall 
wage disadvantage to a Bolivian working in the US is such that a native earns close to 
triple the wage of an otherwise (observably and unobservably) identical Bolivian (ν = 3). 
 
With a less extreme assumption about the inherent disadvantage of being Bolivian in the 
US labor market, say ν = 1.5, then selection at the origin does not rise above 1.5 even if 
there is no international transferability of unobserved wage determinants at all (θ = 0). 
The fact that moderately skilled migrants make roughly the same as natives conditioned 
on observed traits (observed ratios 
* w wd between 0.95 and 0.99), appears to be, then, 
incompatible with sufficient positive selection to produce Ro/Re far above 1.5. 
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Figure 6: Selection and migrant outcomes at the destination 
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3.8  Selection and migrant outcomes by occupation 
 
Comparing international wage gaps within low-skill occupations offers still another way 
to assess the degree to which selection could cause Ro and Re to differ. In the lowest-skill 
occupations, there is less scope for unobservable ability to substantially affect wages.  
Previous researchers have documented that wage gaps across countries are enormous 
even for workers in the same sector, such as manufacturing, or in the same narrowly 
defined low-skill occupations, such as carpenters, laborers, or bus drivers (World Bank 
(1995)). 
 
Table 7 gives a sampling of these estimates from other sources for the countries also in 
our sample. The median wage ratios within low-skill occupations are not substantially 
lower than the median estimates of Ro from Table 1. The ratio of real wages in the US to 
those in India for the same low-skill occupation is somewhere between 5 and 14. Our 
estimate for Ro is 6.25. If Ro were driven far above Re by highly entrepreneurial Indians 
experiencing large earnings in the US, wage ratios within narrow low-skill occupations 
would be much smaller than Ro, whereas, if anything, the gaps in Table 7 are larger than 
those in column 6 of table 1.  
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Table 6: Previous estimates of the ratio of wages in the US to those in other 
countries (PPP adjusted), without controlling for individual traits 
 
Source  Freeman & 
Oostendorp
32
   
    Rama & 
Artecona
33 UBS
34 Ro (Table 1, 
column 6) 
Occupation Carpenter  Laborer  Industry  Laborer   
Year  1995 1995  1990-94  2006 2000 
Median  6.36 7.67 4.26 4.65   
N  12 11 28 13   
Selected countries 
Bolivia  6.15 6.37 5.32   5.03 
India  9.15 7.67 5.32  14.16 6.25 
Mexico  6.57   2.78 7.49 2.53 
Nigeria   10.60     14.85 
Turkey     1.99 2.97 2.68 
 
N gives the number of countries in the source that 1) have data for both the country in question and the US, and 2) are one of the 42 
countries studied in this paper. Blank cells indicate no data for that country. 
 
 
Wage ratios within low-skill occupations contain further information about the degree to 
which the estimated wage ratios could be influenced by selection of return migrants. If 
there is strong negative selection of return migrants, those with the poorest wage 
outcomes at the destination—people who hoped to make it as entrepreneurs, but were 
never able to leave construction or low-skill service jobs—might depart the destination 
country unobserved. This would tend to make the estimated wage ratios overstate the true 
gains to the marginal migrant. If this were exerting strong upward bias on Ro, wage gaps 
within low-skill occupations should be much lower. Comparing Table 6 with column 6 
                                                 
32 Freeman and Oostendorp (2005) calculate average monthly wage rates for male workers, in US dollars at Purchasing 
Power Parity, in 1995. “Carpenter” refers to ILO occupation code 88 (“construction carpenter”), and “laborer” refers to 
ILO code 90. 
33 Rama and Artecona (2002) calculate “industry” wages as: “Labor cost per worker in manufacturing in current US 
dollars per year. Includes male and female workers. Calculated as the ratio between total compensation and the number 
of workers in the manufacturing sector as a whole. Compensation includes direct wages, salaries and other 
remuneration paid directly by the employer; plus all employers’ contributions to social security programs on behalf of 
their employees. Data on labor costs per worker are from plant-level surveys covering relatively large firms, mostly in 
the formal sector of the economy. Figures are converted into US dollars using the average exchange rate for each year. 
In countries of the former Soviet Union, the exchange rate of 1989 is used for previous years.” “Government” wage is 
“Average wage of employees in the central or general government, in current US dollars per year. Includes male and 
female employees. Calculated dividing the government payroll by the total number of employees. Data are from 
government records. Figures are converted into US dollars using the average exchange rate for each year.” Both of 
these are converted to PPP dollars using the PPP-to-official-exchange-rate ratio from World Bank (2007).  
34 The UBS estimates (Hoefert and Hofer (2007)) are for urban areas (respectively: Buenos Aires, New Delhi, Seoul, 
Mexico City, Manila, Bangkok, and Istanbul, with the US represented by New York City), and show the hourly wage 
(assuming 50 working weeks per year) of a “building laborer”, 25 years old, single, unskilled or semi-skilled (p. 41) 
adjusted for cost of living in each city by the prices of 95 goods and 27 services (p. 8). 
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38 
from Table 1 shows that this is not at all the case. The estimates of Ro are not 
systematically higher than wage gaps within low-skill occupations.  
 
3.9  Summary of evidence on selection 
 
Table 7 summarizes the evidence on the degree to which Ro might exceed Re. That is, it 
summarizes the degree to which positive selection of moderate skill migrants on 
unobservable wage determinants causes wage ratios of observably equivalent workers to 
overstate the wage gap of equal productivity workers (and hence wage gain of a marginal 
mover). The new and existing evidence we discuss above suggests that the degree of 
positive selection of existing movers on unobserved wage determinants is modest at best, 
typically inducing a bias of 1.0 to 1.3, with the greatest observed bias (for Peru) at 1.45. 
 
Table 8 shows what would be the consequences of scaling back the estimates of Ro from 
column 6 of table 1 to account for the range of selection typically observed, in two 
different ways. Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 answer the question, “What would Re be if 
migrants were drawn from the x
th percentile of the distribution of the wages of observably 
equivalent workers in the home country?” Columns 3, 5, 7, and 9 show the extent to 
which this differs from the column 6 of table 1, expressed as the ratio of Ro/Re. 
  Table 7:  Summary of estimates of the bias of wage ratios of “observably identical” workers to “equal productivity” workers 
 
Countries  Data and method (source)  Estimated 
Ro/Re 
Estimated 
migrant 
percentile 
Philippines  9-month panel, nationally representative, compare wage residuals of movers 
to non-movers when part of household remains behind.  1.10 54 
Mexico  Same as above, but 12-month panel.  1.03  57 
South Africa  4-year panel of young adults in Cape Town area, compare wage residuals of 
movers to non-movers.  1.20 55 
Haiti, Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, Peru, 
Nicaragua, Mexico, 
Dominican Rep. 
Retrospective wage histories, ethnosurvey method. Compare wage residuals 
of non-movers, former movers, and current movers. 
0.96-1.45 
(median 1.07) 
47-69  
(median 54) 
Tonga (to NZ)  Experimental estimate of wage gain exploiting random visa lottery versus 
unadjusted estimates of wage gain (McKenzie, Gibson, and Stillman (2009)). 1.25 — 
Mexico  Panel comparing the wage regression residual distribution of subsequent 
movers to non-movers (Fernández-Huertas Moraga (2008)).  <1 <50 
Israel  Panel comparing the wage regression residual distribution of subsequent 
movers to non-movers (Gould and Moav (2007) (Figure 4)).  <1 <50 
37 countries 
Comparing our estimates of Ro to Hall and Jones (1999) estimates from 
macroeconomic data of the ratio of marginal products of human capital 
adjusted labor. 
1.16-1.38  
ν = 2.0, θ = 0.5  1.17   
ν = 2.0, θ = 0.2  1.57    At mediang of 42 
countries 
Scenarios of selection based on 
observed 
* w wd and supposed θ and ν 
ν = 1.5, θ = 0.2  1.18   
Bolivia, India, 
Mexico, Nigeria, 
Turkey 
Comparing Ro to three different sources of wage gaps within low-skill 
occupations.  Roughly 1   
 
  
Column 8 shows what Re would be if our comparison group of late arrivers in the US 
were drawn from the 70
th percentile of origin country residual—which is stronger than 
any of the evidence from any country above supports. Even in this extreme case the 
median estimate of Re is 3.4—equal productivity workers make more than triple in the 
US—and in 38 of 42 countries even under these assumptions about selection, Re > 2. 
 
The final column of table 8 illuminates the selection issue from a different angle, which is 
to calculate how strong positive selection on unobservable wage determinants would 
have to be in order for the wage ratio to be equal to 2. (In other words, workers’ wages 
would double at the border and such a ratio, as we show below, is almost certainly higher 
than could be sustained as an equilibrium in the absence of policy barriers.) Looking at 
the distributions in Figure 2, this exercise ascends the residual distribution of home-
country workers until the ratio with the mean of the “late arrivers” is just equal to 2. For 
nearly all countries the extent of positive selection even to produce this ratio is far higher 
than any of the diverse evidence from Table 7 supports—the median is the 90
th 
percentile. 
 
Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of the ratios Re in Table 8, under different 
assumptions about the percentile of origin-country unobserved wage determinants from 
which migrants come.
35 Take, for example, the median Peruvian-born, Peruvian educated 
35 year-old urban male with 9 years of education who resides in the US. If his 
counterfactual wage lies at the median of the distribution of wages for observably 
identical workers in Peru, Re is 4.1. If his counterfactual wage lies at the 40
th percentile, 
Re is 4.8. If it is at the 60
th percentile, Re is 3.5, and if it is at the 70
th percentile Re is about 
3. (This differs slightly from the estimate in Table 3, which reflects the mean migrant 
rather than the median migrant.)
                                                 
35 These are nonparametric estimates in the sense that they impose no assumptions on the form of the distribution of the 
unobserved determinants of earnings in the migrants’ home country nor the distribution in the destination country. 
 
    
 
Table 8: Implied Re under different assumptions about selection  
                 
    
  
Assumed percentile of median migrant wage in origin-country 
distribution of wages for observably identical workers   
 
Col 6, 
Table 1 
 40
th percentile  50
th percentile  60
th percentile  70
th percentile   
  Ro   Re  Ro/Re  Re  Ro/Re  Re  Ro/Re  Re  Ro/Re  
Origin 
percentile 
required 
if Re = 2 
Column:  (1)   (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)   (10) 
Yemen 15.45    18.54  0.83  16.64  0.93  14.94  1.03  13.54  1.14   98.5 
Nigeria 14.85    13.93  1.07  10.34  1.44  8.36  1.78  6.92  2.15   99.2 
Egypt 11.92    15.95  0.75  14.28  0.83  12.62  0.94  11.06  1.08   99.9 
Haiti 10.31    12.03  0.86  8.76  1.18  5.43  1.90  4.08  2.53   85.9 
Cambodia 7.45    9.19  0.81  7.57  0.98  6.28  1.19  5.21  1.43   96.5 
Sierra Leone  7.43    9.33  0.80  8.47  0.88  7.28  1.02  5.99  1.24   99.6 
Ghana 7.12    9.14  0.78  7.50  0.95  6.20  1.15  5.17  1.38   94.8 
Indonesia 6.72    8.14  0.83  7.05  0.95  6.20  1.08  5.39  1.25   98.8 
Pakistan 6.57    7.96  0.83  7.00  0.94  6.23  1.05  5.43  1.21   98.6 
Venezuela 6.57    8.01  0.82  7.16  0.92  6.47  1.02  5.61  1.17   98.9 
Cameroon 6.53    8.58  0.76  7.30  0.89  6.03  1.08  5.02  1.30   96.5 
Vietnam 6.49    8.23  0.79  7.03  0.92  6.04  1.07  5.22  1.24   99.1 
India 6.25    8.24  0.76  7.05  0.89  6.09  1.03  5.16  1.21   97.0 
Jordan 5.65    6.68  0.85  6.02  0.94  5.40  1.05  4.88  1.16   99.3 
Ecuador 5.16    6.37  0.81  5.54  0.93  4.86  1.06  4.22  1.22   97.4 
Bolivia 5.03    6.10  0.82  5.37  0.94  4.66  1.08  4.09  1.23   95.0 
Sri Lanka  4.95    5.87  0.84  5.07  0.98  4.49  1.10  3.90  1.27   97.0 
Nepal 4.85    6.46  0.75  5.60  0.87  4.95  0.98  4.42  1.10   98.2 
Bangladesh 4.60    5.65  0.81  5.11  0.90  4.53  1.02  4.01  1.15   97.1 
Uganda 4.38    6.28  0.70  5.20  0.84  4.22  1.04  3.45  1.27   91.0 
Ethiopia 4.35    5.61  0.78  4.70  0.93  3.93  1.11  3.35  1.30   90.4 
Guyana 3.87    4.94  0.78  4.34  0.89  3.85  1.01  3.40  1.14   93.5 
Philippines 3.82    4.56  0.84  3.77  1.01  3.21  1.19  2.73  1.40   87.3 
Peru 3.79    4.77  0.79  4.08  0.93  3.47  1.09  2.98  1.27   90.1 
Brazil 3.76    4.80  0.78  4.23  0.89  3.69  1.02  3.20  1.18   91.0 
Jamaica 3.63    4.72  0.77  4.23  0.86  3.73  0.97  3.29  1.10   92.5 
Chile 3.53    4.34  0.81  3.89  0.91  3.45  1.02  3.04  1.16   91.9 
Nicaragua 3.52    4.32  0.81  3.83  0.92  3.36  1.05  2.92  1.21   87.7 
Panama 3.36    4.22  0.80  3.69  0.91  3.25  1.03  2.79  1.20   86.1 
Uruguay 3.10    3.86  0.80  3.32  0.93  2.86  1.08  2.44  1.27   80.5 
Guatemala 2.94    3.58  0.82  3.11  0.95  2.65  1.11  2.30  1.28   77.2 
Colombia 2.88    3.46  0.83  3.08  0.94  2.71  1.06  2.37  1.22   83.3 
Paraguay 2.78    3.44  0.81  3.00  0.93  2.62  1.06  2.25  1.24   78.3 
South Africa  2.75    3.67  0.75  3.08  0.89  2.56  1.07  2.12  1.30   73.7 
Turkey 2.68    3.49  0.77  3.17  0.85  2.88  0.93  2.58  1.04   86.6 
Argentina 2.54    3.20  0.79  2.81  0.90  2.41  1.05  2.07  1.23   77.1 
Mexico 2.53    3.19  0.79  2.79  0.91  2.40  1.05  2.08  1.22   72.2 
Belize 2.43    3.00  0.81  2.64  0.92  2.38  1.02  2.03  1.20   71.5 
Thailand 2.17    2.64  0.82  2.24  0.97  1.94  1.12  1.65  1.32   66.1 
Costa Rica  2.07    2.58  0.80  2.29  0.90  2.03  1.02  1.79  1.16   61.1 
Morocco 2.00    2.28  0.88  2.04  0.98  1.83  1.09  1.62  1.23   51.1 
Dom. Rep.  1.99    2.58  0.77  2.26  0.88  1.98  1.01  1.71  1.16   59.2 
                  
Median  4.11    5.28  0.805 4.52 0.92 3.89 1.05 3.38  1.225    91.45 
 
Table reflects predicted wages for 35 year-old urban male with 9 years of education. The first column reproduces column 6 of Table 1. 
“Residual wage” refers to the residual when ln wage is regressed on education, age, sex, and rural/urban as described in the text. The 
rightmost column shows the percentile of the origin-country distribution of unobserved determinants of income from which the mean 
migrant would need to be drawn in order for Re to equal 2 given the estimated Ro. 
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Figure 3: Estimated Re under different assumptions about selection 
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Countries are sorted left to right by the estimate of Ro in Table 1, column 6. Different shades show assumed expected percentile of the 
marginal migrant in the distribution of the unobservable determinants of earnings in the migrant’s home country. 
 
 
 
4  Interpreting the estimates: To what degree are wage gaps sustained by policy 
barriers? 
 
The preceding section gives several reasons to believe that the wage ratios in Table 1 are 
modest overestimates of the “place premium”―wage ratios for workers of equal intrinsic 
productivity―but that there are nevertheless enormous gains in real consumption wages 
from moving across the border. It is at least conceivable that the estimated gains in wages 
are sufficiently offset by transport costs, credit constraints, and by other psychic costs of 
movement across borders so that the wage gaps are not policy induced but reflect 
compensating differentials in equilibrium.  
 
There is, however, strong evidence that border restrictions do prevent movement. The 
Gallup organization surveyed individuals around the world and asked: “Ideally, if you 
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had the opportunity, would you like to move permanently to another country, or would 
you prefer to continue living in this country?”  For the 38 countries for which our data 
overlap, fully 25 percent of individuals reported they would like to live in another 
country, including 42 percent of all Peruvians, 42 percent of all Bangladeshis, 46 percent 
of all Ethiopians, and 58 percent of all Nigerians, but only 9 percent of Indonesians or 
Indians.
36  
 
Even these numbers likely understate the demand for generalized labor mobility, as they 
asked only about permanent movement. A survey conducted for the World Bank’s World 
Development on Youth asked individuals aged 15-24, “If it were possible for you to 
legally move to another country to work, would you?” with options of “move 
permanently”, “move temporarily”, “try it out”, and “not move”. Two of the surveyed 
countries overlap with our estimates and the Gallup Poll: Bangladesh and Ethiopia. In 
Bangladesh the expressed demand for temporary movement among males was enormous; 
only about 10 percent said they would “not move” but only 5 percent would “move 
permanently”—about 75 percent said they would “move temporarily” or “try it out.” In 
Ethiopia, only about a quarter said they would “not move” and again most of the demand 
for movement was for temporary movement or “try it out” (World Bank (2007) (Figure 
8.5)). While these two surveys are impossible to compare because youth are more likely 
to move than older individuals and the sample frames are not the same, it does suggest 
that demand for temporary labor mobility is large compared the desire for permanent 
migration. In either case, while this evidence is not about moving to the US and we do 
not assert that the only motivation of movement is wage gains, nevertheless the expressed 
demand for movement “ideally” or “if it were legal” is many times, if not orders of 
magnitude, larger than actual cross-border movement.  
 
We now turn to estimating what fraction of the wedge Re might be reasonably believed to 
be sustained by policy barriers to labor movement. We approach this question by 
estimating wage ratios in settings where there are few legal barriers to movement and 
migration is entirely self-selected: (i) movement from Puerto Rico, Guam, and 
                                                 
36 http://www.gallup.com/poll/108325/OneQuarter-Worlds-Population-May-Wish-Migrate.aspx. 
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Micronesia to the United States; (ii) movement between US states; (iii) movement from 
French Overseas Departments to metropolitan France; and (iv) movement between 
Europe and the New World before the establishment of substantial policy barriers at the 
destination. 
 
4.1  The US zone of free movement  
 
Certain states and territories associated with the US provide a useful test case as they are 
geographically and culturally similar to countries in the sample, but face almost no policy 
barrier against movement to the continental US. People from the Associated Free State of 
Puerto Rico, for example, enjoy US citizenship allowing free movement to the 
continental US. People from the Territory of Guam likewise hold US citizenship and can 
move at will to the continental US. 
 
Table 9 begins by using data from the US census to carry out regressions identical to 
equation (1) to estimate Ro for Puerto Rico and Guam.
37 Here, “foreign” born signifies 
birth in Puerto Rico or Guam, rather than the mainland. Analogously to Table 1, the first 
two columns do not control for any individual traits. Column 1 places mainland-born 
mainland-residents in the numerator, and column 2 places “foreign”-born mainland 
residents in the numerator. Columns 3 and 4 repeat the previous columns but include the 
same controls for age, education, sex, and rural/urban residence from regression (1). As 
before, the wages are adjusted for purchasing power.
38 The first row of ratios compares 
people in the mainland US to people in Puerto Rico, and the second row restricts the 
comparison to people who describe themselves on the census form as ethnically Puerto 
                                                 
37 With the exception that all foreign-born US residents are combined in a single “foreign”-born, US-resident category, 
as the census does not report year of arrival on the mainland. 
38 Dollar wages in Puerto Rico are converted to “mainland PPP” dollars by dividing by the PPP factor 0.86 from 
Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006). Dollar wages in Guam are converted to mainland purchasing power using figures 
from the Office of Personnel Management (2000: 44142) of the US, which determined in a 1998 survey that a basket of 
basic consumption items (including food at home and away, tobacco, alcohol, furnishings, clothing, domestic services, 
professional services, personal care, and recreation) cost about 20.3% more in Guam than in Washington, DC. This 
figure is not sensitive to different spending patterns at different income levels. 
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Rican. The third row compares people in mainland US to people in Guam, and the fourth 
row restricts the comparison to ethnically Guamanian (Chamorro) people.
39 
 
Table 9: Wage gaps across observably identical workers without policy barriers 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Numerator      
No. of “foreign”-
born observations 
    US-born  X  —  X  — 
    “Foreign” born  —  X  —  X 
Controls? —  —  X  X 
On 
main- 
land 
Off 
main- 
land 
         
Puerto  Rico  1.63 1.42 2.02 1.55  30,900  47,085 
  (1.60, 1.65)  (1.39, 1.46)  (1.94, 2.10)  (1.46, 1.65)     
          
Puerto Rico (ethnic   1.36  1.42  1.72  1.54  27,906  46,640 
   Puerto Ricans only)  (1.34, 1.38)  (1.40, 1.44)  (1.66, 1.78)  (1.49, 1.60)     
          
Guam  (all  races)  1.50 1.40 1.55 1.55  1,923  2,406 
  (1.36, 1.65)  (1.24, 1.58)  (1.22, 1.97)  (1.14, 2.11)     
          
Guam    1.34 1.37 1.14 1.34 667  1,262 
   (Chamorro only)  (1.25, 1.43)  (1.27, 1.48)  (0.89, 1.45)  (1.11, 1.62)     
          
Micronesia      ~1.1–1.4     
          
 
95% confidence interval for ratio estimates shown in parentheses 
 
 
The results suggest that the average Puerto Rican born, ethnically Puerto Rican 35 year-
old urban male with 9 years of education earns about 1.5 times as much as the observably 
identical person in Puerto Rico. For ethnic Guamanians born on Guam, the ratio is 1.3.  
 
Table 8 lists another, less-studied case of a developing country facing no migration 
barrier from the US. Since 1986, any citizen of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) 
can acquire on demand a US work visa of unlimited duration. Akee (2007b) presents 
linked microdata on 632 individuals who were in FSM at the time of the 1994 census and 
had migrated to the United States by the time of the Micronesian Immigrant Survey of 
Hawaii and Guam in 1997. Many people in the sample were self-employed or 
unemployed prior to migration, and only 92 report wage income before and after 
                                                 
39 “Chamorro” people are identified in Guam as people who indicate “ethnicity” as “Pacific islander” and indicate that 
they speak the Chamorro language. “Chamorro” are identified in the US as having been born in Guam and listing 
“race” as “Guamanian or Chamorro alone”. 
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migration. Mean annual pre-migration earnings are roughly US$4,000 and mean annual 
post-migration earnings are roughly US$8,000.
40 Using the PPP deflator of 0.51 for FSM 
with respect to the US as a whole (Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006)), purchasing 
power-adjusted wages would be roughly the same before and after migration. But group 
housing arrangements, food choices, and other strategies allow recently-arrived FSM 
migrants to live at somewhat less than the typical cost of living for full US citizens, 
suggesting that the ratio representing their true real wage gain to migration is likely to be 
in the range of 1.1 to 1.4. Note that in this case the same individuals are being followed 
across the border, so selection bias is absent. This suggests once again that even in the 
presence of substantial transportation costs, wage gaps induced by natural barriers alone 
are limited across spatially and culturally distinct but legally integrated labor markets. 
 
We can compare these gaps to those observed within a spatially, culturally, and legally 
integrated market: The continental US. In the US census data, we estimate wage gaps for 
observably identical workers across the 48 continental United States (without controlling 
for state of birth or state of education), with New York in the denominator. Log wages 
adjusted for purchasing power
41 are regressed on the same dummies for age, years of 
education, sex, and rural/urban residence as in regression (1)
42 and these regressions 
predict wages for a 35 year-old urban male with 9 years of education, as before. The 
highest predicted wage relative to New York is found in Texas (1.18), the lowest in North 
Dakota (0.85). The highest ratio sustained across any of the 48 states is, then, the ratio of 
highest to lowest: 1.38.  
 
These results for US states accord well with domestic rural-urban wage gaps for 
observably identical workers within all 43 developing countries we study. The average 
coefficient on the “rural” dummy for foreign residents in the log wage regression (1) is 
approximately –0.3. This suggests that the average ratio of an urban worker’s wages to 
                                                 
40 Wage and price information in personal communication from the author. These data only capture a relatively short 
window of experience in the destination (less than two years) and wages may increase over a longer time period. 
41 Dollar wages in each of the US states are standardized for purchasing power based on the state cost-of-living 
estimates by Berry, Fording, and Hanson (2000). Only 48 states are estimated because the cost-of-living estimates used 
to standardize wages by purchasing power are missing for Alaska and Hawaii (and the District of Columbia). The state 
of New York is used as the base group. 
42 “Urban” is defined is residing within any of the census-defined “metropolitan” areas of the country. 
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those of an otherwise observably identical rural worker is about 1.4 across all these 
countries on average.
43 Such a wedge reflects the combined effect of natural barriers and 
selection bias. In legally integrated labor markets, movement itself places bounds on how 
high rural/urban wage ratios can rise without population movements.  
 
4.2  The French zone of free movement 
 
Guadeloupe, Martinique, French Guyana, and Réunion are overseas departments of 
France. They are also essentially developing countries with very different geographic, 
cultural, ethnic, economic, and historical traits from metropolitan (continental European) 
France. People born there are French citizens and face no policy barrier if they wish to 
move to the métropole. The French government calculates that in 1999, average 
household disposable income per household member in the métropole was 1.59 times its 
average across the four overseas departments.
44 This can be considered a PPP ratio 
because basic consumption prices in the overseas departments are very similar to those in 
the métropole.
45 Unfortunately, no publicly-available microdata allow us to repeat the 
exercise in Table 8 for France by controlling for individual traits. But populations in the 
overseas departments are generally younger and less educated than in the métropole, so 
this ratio would certainly be lower if individual traits were controlled for. We can thus 
consider 1.6 to be an approximate upper bound on Ro in the French zone of free 
movement. 
 
4.3    The Atlantic economy before 1914  
 
Prior to the introduction of a variety of legal restrictions following the first World War, 
emigrants from Europe to the New World faced few policy barriers to movement. 
                                                 
43 This is in line with the estimates in Sir Arthur Lewis’s (1954) Nobel-winning research, in which he observed that 
rural-urban migration in developing countries is generally triggered when urban-rural real wage gaps rise substantially 
above 1.3. 
44 Ratio of household disposable income per household member in provincial metropolitan France (€16,697) to the 
same figure in the Overseas Departments (€10,482). “Revenu disponible brut des ménages par région (RDB)”, from 
INSEE (2000), Comptes économiques régionaux des ménages - base 2000, 
<http://www.insee.fr/fr/ffc/figure/CMRSOS04238.xls>, accessed September 22, 2008. 
45 INSEE Antilles-Guyane (2008), L’Indice des Prix, No. 11, December (Point-à-Pitre: INSEE Service Régional de 
Guadeloupe), <http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/document.asp?reg_id=26&ref_id=13474>, accessed September 22, 2008. 
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Williamson (1995), Williamson (1997) and Hatton and Williamson (2005) show that 
large-scale migration during this period contributed to tremendous convergence of low-
skill wages. Using Williamson’s data,
46 Figure 7 shows the ratio of real urban 
construction wages in the United States to the wage in several major migrant-origin 
countries in the years up to 1913. By the end of that period the ratio for all of these 
countries except Italy had fallen below 1.8. Italy’s migration started much later and was 
plummeting in 1913, so this can be considered an out-of-equilibrium ratio. 
 
Williamson (1999) (Figure 9) shows that a very similar pattern developed between 
migrant-origin countries of the southern Mediterranean and destination countries in Latin 
America. He constructs, for the decades leading up to 1913, the ratio of real urban 
unskilled wages in Argentina, Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, and Uruguay to a combined 
wage index for Italy, Portugal, and Spain. This ratio fell from between 2 and 3 around 
1880 to an average of about 1.7 around 1913, as large-scale emigration to the New World 
proceeded. Together with the North American evidence above, this suggests that even at 
a time when transportation, information, and (arguably) credit costs were substantially 
higher than today’s, and even in the presence of substantial language and cultural 
barriers, wage ratios above 1.8 could not be sustained in the absence of policy barriers to 
movement. 
 
The lesson of this evidence is that in areas that lack policy barriers to labor movement, 
we do not observe wage ratios for observably equivalent workers across space that 
exceed 1.8 in any historical period, or about 1.5 currently. We have shown that wage 
ratios even for fully equivalent workers from Haiti, the Philippines, Nicaragua, and Peru 
lie far above 1.5-1.8. Table 8 strongly suggests that the same is true for Egypt, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Vietnam, and other countries. We interpret this to mean that the very large 
wage ratios we observe for many countries are sustained by policy barriers to movement. 
                                                 
46 Kindly provided by the author. 
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Figure 7: Ratio of US real urban construction wage to that of major migrant origin 
countries, 1870-1913 
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5  Comparisons of wage gaps and policy implications  
 
Economists often compare the existence of market inefficiencies, were they to exist, to 
“dollar bills lying on the sidewalk”: Price differences create profit-making opportunities. 
Barriers to labor mobility have created differences in the price of moderate-skill labor 
such that there are ten thousand dollar bills lying on the sidewalks in the US. We 
compare the distortions in labor markets to international price gaps for goods and factors. 
We also compare policy-induced wage discrimination at the border to other forms of 
wage discrimination. Finally, we compare the potential gains from migration to other 
forms of poverty reduction policies or programs. 
 
5.1  Comparison with other border-induced price wedges 
 
Trade economists have frequently used directly estimated price differentials of equivalent 
products to estimate the impacts of non-tariff barriers on goods and services (Anderson 
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and Neary (1994) inter alia). The wage ratios reported here use the price of equivalent 
labor, corrected for worker productivity (both observed and unobserved) and 
compensating differentials, to measure the price effects of the existing non-tariff 
restrictions on labor flows. Strikingly, there is a huge flourishing literature on the extent 
of “globalization” that debates just how “flat” the world might be for goods and capital 
that often takes the cliff created by border restrictions for workers for granted.  
 
Many gaps in goods prices have been small for a century: O'Rourke and Williamson 
(2000) (pp. 29-55) report that the transportation revolution in the late nineteenth century 
brought prices of the most basic commodities, such as wheat, to near parity between the 
US and Great Britain. The remaining explicit barriers to trade in many manufactured 
goods are small in the OECD.  
 
There has been some revisionism on the extent to which markets are truly “borderless”—
detailing that even in quite liberal trade environments there is much less trade than would 
be expected, as McCallum (1995) documents for US-Canada trade. Detailed price 
comparisons for 120 industries in 1999 executed by Bradford and Lawrence (2004) (p. 7) 
reveal that consumer prices in many European countries are 30-50% higher than the 
lowest available prices for essentially the same goods in any country, while prices in 
Japan are roughly 100% higher and these differences persist even when one nets out 
retailing costs. Bradford and Lawrence point to these deviations from goods price 
equalization as evidence that globalization has not “gone far enough” as price 
differentials remain substantial. But the substantial gaps they find, of 50 to 100 percent 
(only in some commodities, not on average) are the smallest of the wage gaps. 
 
The situation could not be more different in the market for capital, both in terms of prices 
of financial instruments as well as in marginal products. Lamont and Thaler's (2003) 
survey of the literature on cross-border price gaps for equivalent financial instruments 
suggests that price gaps of 15% (not percentage points) are considered “inexplicably 
large.” Caselli and Feyrer (2006) calculate the marginal product of capital across 
countries and find that marginal products of capital across countries are “essentially 
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equalized.”  In fact, by their estimates, which correct the “naïve” estimates of the 
marginal product of capital for differences “natural capital” and the price of output, the 
return to capital is lower in poor countries than rich countries (8.4% vs. 6.9%, Table 2).  
 
The fact that price gaps for labor exceed price gaps for goods, often by an order of 
magnitude, has obvious implications for the social welfare effects of liberalization as the 
heuristic intuition is that in simple partial equilibrium welfare losses increase with the 
square of price wedges. If one considers the general equilibrium welfare/output gains 
from completely open borders based the gains are astronomical: Hamilton and Whalley 
(1984) estimate a rough doubling of world output per person and Klein and Ventura 
(2004) use a calibrated general equilibrium model with capital mobility and estimate 
gains between 94% and 172%. But one need not consider radical notions like open 
borders, the general equilibrium simulations of Walmsley and Winters (2005) (Table 4, 
col. V) suggest that just a tiny relaxation of barriers to migration into the OECD—
allowing an additional movement of 3% of the existing labor force—would raise the 
welfare of those moving by $170 billion.
47 The World Bank (2005) (p. 128) finds that 
following an elimination of all remaining policy barriers to trade worldwide, developing 
countries would gain $109 billion in annual income by 2015. Caselli and Feyrer (2006) 
estimate the welfare gains from complete equalization of the MPK at one tenth of one 
percent of world GDP—roughly $65 billion—again a small fraction of the gains from 
only a modest relaxation of barriers to labor movement.  
 
5.2  Comparison with other forms of wage discrimination  
 
By “wage discrimination” we mean any labor market force that causes workers of equal 
intrinsic productivity involuntarily to receive different wages because of socially 
constructed characteristics of the workers. Barriers to the movement of workers across 
international borders create wage discrimination of precisely this kind. Suppose a given 
                                                 
47 Their simulations were based on rough assumptions about how much of the existing wage differences were due to 
productivity differences that would move with the worker (which they assume is only half) while our estimates per 
worker are based on data. They find a welfare gain to movers of roughly $20,000 per mover, which is close to our 
estimate for India of P$19,900 (though their estimates are not exclusively of low skill workers).  
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worker has a higher realized productivity in the United States than in Bolivia—due to the 
institutions, technologies, and other complementary inputs available in the United 
States—and therefore would earn higher wages in the United States. Any policy that 
limits the realized productivity of that worker, by limiting access to the United States and 
its complementary inputs, obliges that person to accept a lower wage than he or she could 
potentially realize. This is wage discrimination based on a socially-constructed trait, 
workers’ country of their birth; economically its welfare impact on the worker is 
indistinguishable from forcing one of two workers of equal realized productivity to 
accept a lower wage because they were say, a woman or African-American. While in 
common usage “discrimination” and “prejudice” have become synonymous, no American 
need feel toward that worker any distaste or prejudice, racial or otherwise, in order to 
produce this result.
48 
 
In the United States, the wages of males to those of observably identical females who are 
in the workforce is about 1.3.
49 In our sample of 42 developing countries the median 
domestic ratio of wages of males to observably equivalent females is 1.4 (Madagascar), 
the large magnitude of which explains the justifiable widespread concern about sex and 
gender discrimination. But for several of the countries we consider in the preceding 
section, estimated border-induced wage discrimination vastly exceeds the estimate of 
domestic gender discrimination. 
 
The literature contains several regressions exploring wage gaps between workers that are 
observably identical except for their ethnicity, within spatially integrated labor markets. 
These have included measures of the gaps for black workers in the United States, 
scheduled castes/scheduled tribes in India, indigenous Malaysians, Indigenous 
                                                 
48 Some might question the use of the term “discrimination” for international differences. The foundational model of 
labor market discrimination by Becker (1971) (p. 35) actually begins—for conceptual clarity—as a model of labor 
migration from a black ‘country’ to a white ‘country’, and only later comes to represent racial discrimination in a single 
spatially integrated market by analogy. Becker defines wage discrimination as cross-group differences in wages 
unrelated to worker productivity, which is precisely what we seek here. He notes that “treating discrimination as a 
problem in trade and migration is far from artificial, since they are closely and profoundly related”. Arguments that 
migration restrictions constitute employment discrimination have been advanced in legal theory by Chang (2003) and 
in moral philosophy by Carens (1987). 
49 Altonji and Blank (1999) (Table 1, column 2) show that ln mean hourly wage for a full-year, full-time employed 
white male in 1995 is ln(17.97) = 2.89. The coefficient on female in Table 4, column 6 is –0.241, suggesting the ln 
mean hourly wage for an otherwise observably identical woman is 14.12, and 17.97/14.12 = 1.27 
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Tanzanians, and indigenous Bolivians.
50  All of these reveal that wages in the base group 
exceed wages in the group discriminated against by a factor of 1.1–1.9 unexplained by 
characteristics. For example, the ratio of a white man’s wages to those of an observably 
identical black man in the United States was about 1.6 in 1939 (by 1995 it had fallen to 
about 1.1).
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The lesson of these numbers is that the wage discrimination created by international 
borders is, for large numbers of developing countries, at least as large as any current form 
of wage discrimination against socially disfavored groups within spatially integrated 
labor markets. For many of the 42 developing countries we investigate, it is much larger. 
For several countries—including Nigeria, Haiti, Egypt, and Ghana—the US border effect 
on the wages of equal intrinsic productivity workers is greater than any form of wage 
discrimination (gender, race, or ethnicity) that has ever been measured.
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50 Banerjee and Knight (1991) report that in survey data collected in Delhi from October 1975 to April 1976, 
observably identical Indians who were not members of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes (SC/ST) earned 10.9% 
more than members of SC/STs (p. 185). Knight and Sabot (1991) find that in a survey of 1,000 urban Tanzanian firms 
in 1971, people who were not indigenous Africans (almost all of Asian ancestry) earned 87% more than observably 
identical indigenous Africans (p. 65). The Mincer wage regressions of Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1993) (p. 305) 
indicate that a 28% wage deficit for indigenous workers relative to other workers is unexplained by differences in 
observable characteristics, thus 1/(1–0.28) = 1.39. Schafgans (1998) (p. 483) finds a maximum differential in wages 
between Chinese and Malay males unexplained by observables of 27%, thus 1/(1–0.27) = 1.37. 
51 Altonji and Blank (1999) (Table 1, column 2) show that ln mean hourly wage for a full-year, full-time employed 
white male in 1995 is ln(17.97) = 2.89. The coefficient on black is –0.067, suggesting that ln mean hourly wage for an 
otherwise observably identical black male is 16.81, and 17.97/16.81 = 1.07. Chandra (2000) documents the substantial 
narrowing of the black-white wage gap between 1940 and 1990, and Heckman, Lyons, and Todd (2000) suggest that 
some substantial portion of the narrowing during this period remains unexplained by changes in observable 
characteristics other than race. Sundstrom (2007) (p. 412) conducts Mincer regressions using the 1940 US census and 
finds a black-white wage gap of 36% unexplained by observable characteristics in 1939 wages. 
52 It is not clear that historical wage discrimination against African Americans, even at its most egregious—which is to 
say, when African Americans were routinely and forcibly held as property by other Americans—was ever as large as 
the wage discrimination caused by today’s limitation of movement between the US and the poorest countries. Wage 
discrimination against slaves (not the full effect of slavery, but exclusively the earnings effect) can be plausibly 
measured by comparing slave rental rates—reflective of slaves’ productivity indicator in a competitive rental market—
to the cash value of owners’ maintenance costs. Though surviving data are controversial and inexact, some estimates 
suggest that US slaves’ productivity was roughly four times the cash value of food, shelter, clothing, and medical care 
that they received. This is well below today’s degree of wage discrimination produced by international borders against 
naturals of many development countries. Fogel and Engerman (1974) (II.159), for example, estimate $60.62 as the cash 
value of average maintenance and compensation for adult male enslaved field hands on large plantations, and the same 
authors (II.73) present rental rates for the Lower South of $143 in 1841-45, $168 in 1846-50, $167 in 1851-55, and 
$196.5 in 1856-60; the simple average of these four figures is $168.6. Note that these rental rates are net of 
maintenance costs (II.75), so the average rate inclusive of maintenance is $229.2. In a competitive rental market, this 
would suggest that enslaved workers were producing 3.8 times what was spent to sustain them. 
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5.3  Comparison with other antipoverty interventions for the marginal worker 
 
There is a sense of unease with the widening global inequalities (in absolute, and for 
some countries, relative terms) and a sense that “globalization” should be made more 
“equitable” by addressing the concerns of poor, a sense which has motivated social 
movements such as debt relief, “fair trade” movements, attempts to make the Doha round 
of WTO negotiations a “development” round, “anti-sweatshop” activism, the promotion 
of micro-credit, the evaluation of social programs, and so on. However, it should be 
obvious that if the marginal welfare gains from relaxing border constraints are larger. We 
have shown that these gains are on the order of P$10,000 for workers from countries 
whose annual income is on the order of P$5,000 per capita—the average for the 
developing world in aggregate. Movement must, therefore, reduce poverty more reliably 
and immediately for the marginal household than anything in situ antipoverty 
intervention under consideration.  
 
Consider the documented wage gains due to microcredit provision, international labor 
rights campaigns, schooling incentives, and medical interventions. The pioneering (if 
controversial) estimate by Pitt and Khandker (1998) of the net return on microloans to 
Bangladeshi women is 18%, which means that the intervention multiplies household 
income by a factor of 1.14.
53 Harrison and Scorse (2004) (p. 21 and Table 1B) find that 
international anti-sweatshop campaigns against textile, footwear, and apparel plants in 
Indonesia in the early 1990s caused higher wages for workers at foreign-owned and 
export-focused plants by a factor of 1.20 to 1.25. In a typical country from our sample, 
the simple Mincer coefficient on years of schooling is 0.061,
54 meaning that three 
additional years of schooling somehow costlessly induced by an ideal incentive program 
would raise wages by a factor of around 1.2. Finally, Kremer and Miguel (2004) (p. 206), 
                                                 
53 Their estimate of the return to males is 11%, but we use the higher figure for females to be conservative. Average 
annual female borrowing is Tk3415, or US$361 at PPP using the average PPP conversation factor from World Bank 
(2007) over the relevant period (1986-1992) of 9.47. The resulting increase in household income is thus Tk615. Since 
annual income is Tk4372 (their Table A2), earnings rise by a factor of (4372+615)/4372 = 1.14. 
54 This is not the “return” to schooling, as Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2006) stress; it does not account for costs of 
the education investment, most notably the opportunity cost of time. Strictly speaking, by the assumptions underlying 
the Mincer model the marginal return to schooling is zero, since individuals acquire education until the benefit equals 
the opportunity cost. 
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find that medicating children to eliminate hookworm, roundworm, and other helminthic 
parasites is “by far the most cost-effective method of improving school participation 
among a series of educational interventions” attempted in Busia, Kenya that underwent 
randomized evaluations. But the lifetime increment in wages thereby caused is 1.01.
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These values suggest that for a large number of countries, there is no rigorously evaluated 
in situ antipoverty intervention in the development economics literature capable of 
causing wage gains for the marginal household that come anywhere near those accruing 
from movement across borders. It is revelatory to calculate how long a worker would 
have to be allowed to work at US wages, for a willing employer as their wages are 
justified by their productivity in the US, in order to match the gains from other, widely 
popular, anti-poverty interventions. We have previously calculated that the net present 
value of lifetime access to micro-credit (again, under generous assumptions on returns) is 
the equivalent of the wage differential of a Bangladeshi man for one month of work in the 
US (Clemens, Montenegro and Pritchett, 2008).  
 
This of course does not suggest that in situ interventions are not worth carrying out. Any 
intervention with a positive net present value is worth carrying out, and there is no reason 
not to do several in parallel. Furthermore, the general equilibrium effects of very large 
movements of people could differ from the marginal effects we measure, just as the 
general equilibrium effects of in situ antipoverty programs can differ enormously from 
the marginal effects measured by a field trial. That said, the marginal wage effects of 
movement can greatly exceed the marginal wage effects of in situ policies, and deserve a 
larger role in the discussion of development and antipoverty initiatives.  
 
6 Conclusion 
 
The combination of wage surveys around the world with the US Census allows us to 
estimate cross-border wage differences for observably equivalent workers between the 
                                                 
55 The Mincer coefficient on years of schooling is 0.07, and the program causes an increase of 0.14 years in averages 
schooling. 
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US and 42 developing countries. The median wage gap for a male, unskilled (9 years of 
schooling), 35 year-old, urban formal sector worker born and educated in a developing 
country is P$15,400 per year at purchasing power parity. This figure understates the gain 
in household welfare caused by crossing the border if any of the wage increment is spent 
in the country of origin—as remittances or repatriated savings—where prices are lower 
and a dollar is worth more than a PPP dollar. To be conservative, we do not make any 
corresponding adjustment in our estimates. 
 
On the other hand, the same estimate of the wage gain tends to overstate the true gains to 
a potential migrant both because of selection of migrants and because of welfare losses 
from moving. We offer a combination of new evidence on selection (in 9 of the 42 
countries with new data) and wage differentials in legally integrated markets to suggest it 
would be conservative to scale back the wage ratios of observational equivalent workers 
by 1.5 to produce an estimate of the wage gains to a worker of equal intrinsic 
productivity who is willing to move.  
 
We began this paper seeking to connect two empirical facts: the worldwide mesh of 
restrictions on labor movement, and large global differences in income. A conservative 
estimate of the welfare gain to a moderately skilled worker in the median country of our 
sample moving to the US is P$10,000 per worker, per year, roughly double income per 
capita in the developing world.  We give evidence that gaps like these can only persist 
from policy barriers to labor movement. This means that those barriers create one of the 
largest distortions in any global market, create the largest form of wage discrimination 
observed in today’s world, and create what is apparently the largest antipoverty 
intervention available for people from poor countries. The economic consequences of 
such barriers are clearly colossal, but remain largely unexplored.  
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 Appendix Table A1: Sample sizes for regressions underlying Table 1 
 
  Total      
Birth   US  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign 
Residence   US  US  US  Foreign 
Arrival    —  < Age 20  ≥ Age 20  — 
Argentina 475731 454503 1088 1969  18171 
Bangladesh 459990 454503 412 1611  3464 
Belize 456241 454503 476 624  638 
Bolivia 459128 454503 502 953  3170 
Brazil 565725 454503 1422 3740  106060 
Cambodia 464296 454503 1687 1743  6363 
Cameroon 457004 454503 55 282  2164 
Chile 514339 454503 675 1308  57853 
Colombia 491547 454503 4173 8808  24063 
Costa Rica  465756 454503 766 1184  9303 
Dominican Republic  473726 454503 6528 9679  3016 
Ecuador 477768 454503 2722 5028  15515 
Egypt 461275 454503 708 2088  3976 
Ethiopia 478235 454503 515 1457  21760 
Ghana 459889 454503 309 1593  3484 
Guatemala 470657 454503 5115 8465  2574 
Guyana 461272 454503 1988 3701  1080 
Haiti 466569 454503 3522 8026  518 
India 564435 454503 4897 22593  82442 
Indonesia 565564 454503 717 1048  109296 
Jamaica 472060 454503 6099 9375  2083 
Jordan 466559 454503 465 604  10987 
Mexico 718994 454503 116752 129862  17877 
Morocco 459465 454503 349 709  3904 
Nepal 455887 454503 77 251  1056 
Nicaragua 464411 454503 2712 3506  3690 
Nigeria 460931 454503 697 3091  2640 
Pakistan 471846 454503 1303 3628  12412 
Panama 470010 454503 2097 1755  11655 
Paraguay 460959 454503 77 175  6204 
Peru 475229 454503 2207 5472  13047 
Philippines 532727 454503 13696 30630  33898 
Sierra Leone  455581 454503 109 503  466 
South Africa  474877 454503 531 1188  18655 
Sri Lanka  471740 454503 134 603  16500 
Thailand 486832 454503 1984 2256  28089 
Turkey 528367 454503 772 1332  71760 
Uganda 457497 454503 71 290  2633 
Uruguay 473507 454503 238 424  18342 
Venezuela 487625 454503 1041 1623  30458 
Vietnam 501954 454503 10856 16712  19883 
Yemen 465329 454503 143 194  10489 
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APPENDIX: DATA 
 
A1 Sources 
 
Survey data on wages and other worker characteristics from 42 developing countries 
were compiled by Indermit S. Gill and his team at the World Bank. Appendix Table A3 
lists the original sources and size of each sample, as well as reproducing the exact text of 
the wage question from each survey. A detailed description of the database can be found 
in Montenegro and Hirn (2008). 
 
In three surveys (India, Turkey and the US), the respondent’s education level is listed as 
achievement categories rather than as years of schooling. We translate these categories 
into years of schooling according to the information available in the surveys. In the 
particular case of the US we use the following concordance: 0 years if “less than 1st 
grade”; 3 years if “1st through 4th grade”; 5.6666 years if “5th or 6th”; 7.6666 years if 
“7th or 8th”; 9, 10, 11, or 12 have separate categories; 12 years if “high school 
equivalent”; 13.5 years if “some college but no degree”; 14 years if “associate degree” or 
equivalent; 16 years if “bachelor’s degree”; 18 years if “master’s degree”; 19 years if 
“professional degree”; 20 years if “doctoral degree”. This is a compromise blend of the 
methods used in Bratsberg and Terrell (2002) and in Jaeger (1997). 
 
All data except the cost of living index used in the wage regressions for US states and 
Puerto Rico come from the United States Public Use Microdata Sample (5%) of the 2000 
census. US state and Puerto Rico cost of living index comes from the revised 2004 
version of the Berry-Fording-Hanson (BFH) state cost of living index (described in 
Berry, Fording, and Hanson (2000)), which excludes Alaska, Hawaii, and the District of 
Columbia. In the BFH index for 1999, 1 is the purchasing power of $1 in the median US 
state. For Puerto Rico we use 0.86, which is the PPP conversion factor for 1999 from the 
Penn World Table 6.2 (Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006)). 
 
A2 Quality 
 
An important question we do not take up in the text is the degree to which the surveys are 
representative of the wage sector and of the country—though all were designed to be. 
One way to check the representativeness of the wage surveys is to compare national 
accounts estimates of labor income per worker at PPP in each country to the average 
wage from the surveys we use. There is no reason to expect these to be equal—most 
importantly because the wage data we use do not include self-employed people and 
therefore do not include large portions of the informal sector, and even informal-sector 
wage workers can be harder to sample than formal-sector workers. But enormous 
differences between the two could signal problems in the representativeness of the survey 
data. 
 
Appendix Figure 1 plots this comparison. Labor income per worker is calculated by the 
method of Gollin (2002), under the assumption that a 0.65 share of GDP accrues to labor. 
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The dotted line shows a 45-degree line and the solid line shows a cubic least-squares fit 
to the data including a dummy for Honduras (R
2 = 0.756; or R
2 = 0.607 without the 
Honduras dummy). Large amounts of self-employment would tend to push countries 
down and to the right; large amounts of low-wage informal sector work would tend to 
push countries up and to the left. 
 
Appendix Figure A1:  Comparison of labor income per worker and survey-based 
wages 
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Line shows cubic regression fit of ln(wage) on ln(labor income), its square, and its cube, with a dummy for Honduras. 
 
 
We draw three lessons from Figure 1. First, the agreement is in general very good. 
Average wage is typically some reasonable fraction of average labor income, varying 
across countries as would be expected given different relative sizes of the informal sector 
and the self-employed sector. Second, formal-sector wages are clearly not representative 
of typical worker earnings in the poorest countries with very large informal sectors (e.g. 
Sierra Leone, Chad, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Uganda). This is to be expected given 
that earnings gaps between the formal and informal sector are highest in the poorest 
countries (Vollrath (Forthcoming)). Third, the Honduras survey appears anomalous and 
we drop Honduras from subsequent reported analysis (since our preferred results are from 
bi-lateral regressions this has no consequence for other countries’ results). Overall, this 
analysis highlights the fact that all of the estimates to follow can only be interpreted as 
applying to a worker moving across the formal wage-labor sector. If indeed the formal-
informal gap is much larger in poor countries, this underestimates the wage gains for a 
typical worker.
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Appendix Table A2: Household survey data sources 
 
Country  Year  Survey  Survey agency  Sample   Wage question 
Argentina  2001  Encuesta Permanente de 
Hogares 
Instituto Nacional 
de Estadísticas y 
Censos (INDEC) 
19,706  Cuanto cobró por ese mes por esos conceptos? (Monto 
total de sueldos/jornales, salario familiar, horas extras, 
otras bonificaciones habituales y tickets vales o similares) 
Bangladesh 2000 Household  Income 
Expenditure Survey 
Bureau of 
Statistics 
3,517  What is your total net take-home monthly cash 
remuneration after all deductions at source? 
Belize  1995  Survey of Living 
Conditions 
Central Statistical 
Office 
783  What is your gross monthly income? 
Bolivia  2002  Encuesta de Hogares  Instituto Nacional 
de Estadísticas 
3,244  Cuál es el salario líquido de su trabajo en horario normal? 
Brazil 2005  Pesquisa  Nacional  per 
Amostra de Domicílios 
Instituto Brasileiro 
de Geografia e 
Estatística 
107,955  Qual era o rendimento mensual que você ganhava 
normalmente em setembro de 2003, nesse trabalho? 
Cambodia 2004  Household  Socio-
Economic Survey 
National Institute 
of Statistics 
8,578  How much did you earn in salary/wages from this activity 
last month? 
Cameroon 2001  Enquête  Camerounaise 
Auprès de Ménages 
Direction de la 
Statistique et de la 
Comptabilité 
Nationale 
5,098  A quel montant estimez vous la totalité des revenues issus 
de votre emploi principal le mois dernier? 
Chile 2003  Encuesta de 
Caracterización Socio-
económica Nacional 
Ministerio de 
Planificación 
59,532  En el mes pasado, cuál fue su ingreso o remuneración 
líquida en su ocupación principal? 
Colombia 2000  Encuesta  Continua  de 
Hogares 
Departamento 
Administrativo 
Nacional de 
Estadística 
27,996  Cuanto ganó el mes pasado en este empleo? (incluya 
propinas y comisiones y excluya viáticos y pagos en 
especie) 
Costa Rica  2001  Encuesta de Hogares de 
Propósitos Multiples 
Instituto Nacional 
de Estadísticas y 
Censos 
12,503  En su ocupación principal, cuál fue el ingreso 
efectivamente percibido por concepto de sueldo, salario, 
jornal, propinas, horas extras, en el último periodo de 
pago (semana, quincena o mes)? 
Dominican 
Republic 
1997  Encuesta Nacional de 
Fuerza de Trabajo 
Departamento de 
Cuentas 
Nacionales y 
Estadísticas 
Económicas del 
Banco Central 
3,056  Cuánto le pagan o gana usted y cada qué tiempo en ese 
trabajo? 
Ecuador  2004  Encuesta de Empleo, 
Desempleo y Subempleo 
Instituto Nacional 
de Estadísticas y 
Censos 
17,576  En su ocupación cuánto dinero líquido recibió por 
concepto de sueldo o salario u otros ingresos en el mes de 
marzo? 
Egypt 1998  Labor  Market  Survey  Central Agency for 
Public 
Mobilization and 
Statistics 
4,776  What is the net amount received in basic net wage? 
Ethiopia  2005  National Labour Force  Central Statistical 
Authority 
22,568  What was the amount paid in your main occupation during 
the last period? 
Ghana 1991  Living  Standards Surveys 
Round Three 
Statistical Office  5,749  What is the amount of money you will receive for this 
work? 
Guatemala 2002  Encuesta Nacional Sobre 
Condiciones de Vida 
Instituto Nacional 
de Estadísticas 
2,584  Cuál es el último ingreso neto o ganancia que recibió? 
Guyana 1992  Living  Standards 
Measurement Survey 
Bureau of 
Statistics 
1,266  What is your cash income from paid employment (BASIC 
wage or salary)? 
Haiti  2001  Les Conditions de Vie en 
Haïti 
Institut Haïtien de 
Statistique et 
d'Informatique 
1,220  What is your wage, salary, commission payments, 
bonuses or other cash income (includying overtime) from 
employer? 
India  1999  Socio-economic Survey  National Sample 
Survey 
Organization 
94,306  What are the wage and salary earnings (received or 
receivable) for the work done during the week? 
Indonesia  2002  Survei Sosial Ekonomi 
Nasional 
Badan Pusat 
Statistik 
129,279  How much is the wage/net salary received in a month of 
main work? 
Jamaica 2002  Jamaica  Survey of Living 
Conditions 
Statistical Institute 
of Jamaica 
3,723  What is the value of all income received in cash or in kind 
during the past 12 months? 
Jordan 2002  Household  Income 
Expenditure Survey 
Household 
Surveys 
Directorate 
12,824  What is the total income from employment? 
Mexico  2002  Encuesta Nacional de 
Ingresos y Gastos de los 
Hogares 
Instituto Nacional 
de Estadística, 
Geografía e 
Informática 
18,064  Cuánto recibió el mes pasado por sueldos, salarios y 
jornales en el mes pasado? (declare su ingreso bruto) 
Morocco  1998  Enquête Nationale sur les 
Niveaux de Vie des 
Ménages 
Secretariat d’État à 
la Population, 
Direction de la 
Statistique 
4,043  Quel a été votre salaire en espèce dans votre travail ? 
Nepal  2003  Living Standards Survey 
II 
Central Bureau of 
Statistics 
2,216  How much did you get in cash per day for this job? 
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Nicaragua  2001  Encuesta Nacional de 
Hogares Sobre Medición 
de Nivel de Vida 
Instituto Nacional 
de Estadísticas y 
Censos 
3,757  Cuál es el último ingreso neto que tuvo usted? 
Nigeria  2003  Living Standards Surveys  Federal Office of 
Statistics 
3,084  What is the amount of money you received or you will 
receive for this work? 
Pakistan 2001  Integrated  Household 
Survey 
Federal Bureau of 
Statistics 
13,186  How much is your take-home pay, including bonuses or 
cash allowances? 
Panama  2003  Encuesta de Hogares  Dirección de 
Estadística y 
Censo 
14,392  Cuál es salario o ingreso mensual en su trabajo? (si es 
empleado investigue sueldos y salarios brutos—sin 
deducir impuestos ni contribuciones al seguro social) 
Paraguay  2001  Encuesta Permanente de 
Hogares 
Dirección General 
de Estadísticas, 
Encuestas y 
Censos 
6,254  Cuál fue el monto del último pago neto o líquido que 
recibió (incluyen descuentos por préstamos, asociaciones, 
etc.)? Si no le han pagado todavía, cuánto espera que le 
paguen y que periodo de tiempo incluye este pago? 
Peru  2002  Encuesta Nacional de 
Hogares 
Instituto Nacional 
de Estadísticas e 
Informática 
13,367  Cuál fue ingreso total en el pago anterior incluyendo horas 
extras, bonificaciones, pago por concepto de refrigerio, 
mobilidad, comisiones, etc.? 
Philippines 2002 Annual  Poverty 
Indicators Survey 
National Statistics 
Office 
34,626  Total Income, salary/wages from employment 
Sierra 
Leone 
2003 Integrated  Household 
Survey 
Statistics Sierra 
Leone 
565  What is the amount of money you received or you will 
receive? 
South 
Africa 
2000  Labour Force Survey  Statistics South 
Africa 
21,707  What is your total salary/pay in your main job? 
Sri Lanka  2002  Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey 
Department of 
Census and 
Statistics 
16,772  What is the wage/salary you received last calendar month? 
Thailand  2002  Socio-economic Survey  National Statistical 
Office 
28,258 Wage  and  salaries 
Turkey  2005  Household Labour Force 
Survey 
State Institute of 
Statistics 
75,610  How much did you earn from main job activity during the 
last month? 
Uganda  2002  Socio-economic Survey  Uganda Bureau of 
Statistics 
3,204  How much do you earn per period? (effort should be taken 
to get the net salary after the deduction of taxes) 
United 
States 
1999  2000 Census Population 
and Housing (Public Use 
Microdata Sample) 
US Census Bureau  1,124,253  Wages, salary, commissions, bonuses, or tips from all 
jobs. Report amount before deductions for taxes, bonds, 
dues or other items 
Uruguay 1995  Encuesta  Continua  de 
Hogares 
Instituto Nacional 
de Estadísticas 
19,142  Cuánto ganó el mes pasado como empleado u obrero del 
sector público o privado? 
Venezuela  2004  Encuesta de Hogares por 
Muestreo Nacional 
Instituto Nacional 
de Estadísticas 
34,569  En un mes normal cuánto es su ganancia neta? 
Vietnam 2002  Household  Living 
Standard Survey 
General Statistical 
Office 
19,920  In the past 12 months, how much did you receive from 
this work in money and in kind? 
Yemen 2005  Household  Budget 
Survey 
Central Statistical 
Organization 
10,583  How much was your last pay? (net of taxes and any other 
deduction) 
 
Reported sample size corresponds the number of people in each survey who are wage earners and of age 15-65. Of the US sample, 500,319 were born in 
the US. 
 